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In the post-9/11 era, US and European security interests have diverged.  Though 
this situation was not immediately apparent in the aftermath of the attacks of 11 
September 2001, during the lead-up to the war in Iraq, the truth of the matter became 
unmistakable when the Europeans, led by Germany and France, suddenly began to 
question the nature of the terrorist threat and the militaristic approach advocated by the 
United States.  Despite this difference of opinion among its allies, and its own impending 
European Union (EU) membership, Poland sided with the United States.  While Poland  
was the subject of extensive criticism from its future European Union patrons, its 
government appeared oblivious to the potential that its long-held desire to enjoy the 
benefits of its ties with both Europe and the United States was now jeopardized by the rift 
between the two.  In an uncertain world and among the new threats post-9/11, the 
Republic of Poland found itself confronted with the prospect of having to choose for the 
first time between its close relationship with the United States and its European ties.2 
While Poland struggled with the fallout of its decision to support the United 
States and the war in Iraq against the recommendations of France and Germany, it  
exacerbated the problem through its relations with the European Union.  By early 
December 2003, when the Heads of State and Government of the European Union met in 
Brussels to adopt the EU constitution, Poland again chose to take up a position in 
opposition to that of France and Germany.  Despite the fact that it was still not a member 
of the European Union, Poland remained firm in its opposition to the constitution 
presented to the summit. 
A. ARGUMENT 
An initial assessment of these situations would lead one to believe that Poland had 
chosen the United States over its European partners in both cases.  One's first reaction is: 
                                                 
1  The definitive source on Polish foreign policy after 1989 is Polish Foreign Policy Reconsidered, 
edited by Ilya Prizel and Andrew A. Michta.  For information regarding current Polish foreign and security 
policy since September 11, 2001, Marcin Zaborowski's Poland: A New Power in Transatlantic Security 
provides an in-depth study.  Polish history prior to the end of the communist era is  covered in depth by 
Norman Davies in his two volumes entitled God's Playground. 
2  This thesis was written prior to the rejection of the EU Constitution by the French and Dutch 
populations on 29 May and 1 June 2005 respectively. 
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"Not only is Poland pro-United States, but it is also anti-European Union."  This, 
however, is not the case.  Poland is, in fact, pro-United States, but is also a strong 
supporter of the European Union.  The actual explana tion of this fact, however, is a trifle 
more complicated.  In a world where the United States and Europe no longer share the 
same security interests, Poland finds itself in a precarious situation with regard to its own 
security.  In Europe, more specifically the European Union, Poland finds an institution 
that shares many of its political and economic interests, but which lacks the capabilities 
to provide the security assurances that Poland requires.  In the United States, Poland  sees 
the capabilities necessary to provide the security guarantees it needs, but can never be 
sure that US interests will extend beyond rhetoric and inevitably result in the actual 
realization of these guarantees.  This is the crux of Poland's security problem.  When US 
and European security interests were in harmony, Poland could rely on the capabilities of 
the United States and the interests of Europe to credibly guarantee its security.  When US 
and European security interests diverge, as they have now, Poland can no longer rely on 
the benefits offered by both and, ultimately, must choose either a relationship promising 
interests, but without capabilities or that promising capabilities, but without interests.  
Because interests without capabilities provide minimal benefit, and certainly no true 
guarantees, Poland must choose the capabilities offered by the United States, despite its 
concern about the reliability of US interests.  Certainly this idea helps explain Poland's 
steadfast support of the United States in the war in Iraq and demonstrates the apparent 
atlanticist foundation of Polish security policy. 
At the same time, however, this atlanticism is only a temporary condition.  
Poland's confrontational reputation within the European Union has been earned with the 
purpose of bolstering its ability to influence the pace and direction of European 
integration within the European Union.  Instead of merely working to protect its national 
interests, Poland is also serving notice that its views must be taken into account.  By 
voicing its concerns and its interests, Poland is announcing them to its other European 
partners and putting them on the table for consideration.  Simultaneously, Poland is 
serving notice that it will influence the debate, that it will be a regional leader within the 
European Union, and that it will not allow its interests to be swept aside or, worse yet, 
ignored. 
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Poland is, in fact, biding its time and relying on the security guarantees of the 
United States until such time as Europe's defense capabilities mature and provide the 
necessary guarantees required by Poland.  Given its physical ties on the continent, there 
can be little doubt that when Europe achieves the capabilities necessary to provide for 
Poland's defense and recognizes its threats Poland will no longer be compelled to rely on 
US security guarantees and, if obligated to choose between the United States or its 
continental allies, will find its security in Europe. 
B. OVERVIEW 
This thesis will provide evidence to support the assertion above.  In Chapter III, 
Poland's activities as a relatively new member of both NATO and the European Union 
will be laid out for the reader.  Immediately apparent will be the fact that without an 
existing European Union capability to provide for Poland's defense, Poland has relied on 
NATO, and more specifically the United States, to guarantee its security since 1989.  
Because the United States has minimal actual interests in Poland, however, the Polish 
government has continually made references to its solidarity with the alliance and 
demonstrated its reliability through troop deployments and other support in the hopes that 
this will ensure American reciprocation when necessary.  Poland's actions within NATO 
are a symbol of Poland's concerns with US credibility.  Poland is "whistling in the dark."  
By speaking loudly and often about the necessity for solidarity and reliability, Poland is 
focusing attention on its own concerns related to those concepts within the alliance. 
At the same time, Poland is well aware that the European Union does not 
currently have an existing reliable defense capability.  Despite that fact, however, Poland 
acknowledges that its political and economic interests rest with those of the union.  While 
Poland's initial motivation in 1989 for joining the union was driven by economic 
interests, as the union has evolved, so too have Poland's objectives.  As a middle power, 
conscious of its rightful place in Europe, Poland has sought a leading role within the 
European Union.  To that end, Poland has determined that only by making its interests 
known can it influence events within the union and ensure that its concerns are not stifled 
by those of the European Union's larger members.  While its support of the European 
Security and Defense Policy was originally intended to support the improvement of 
European capabilities within NATO, Poland has come to realize that these capabilities 
 4 
will also play an important role in the defense of Europe.  Without an acknowledgement 
of the security concerns of its Eastern and Central European partners, however, these 
capabilities will not offer any more credibility than Poland received in September 1939 
when Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union invaded. 
Chapter IV of this thesis will provide evidence even more indicative of the nature 
of Polish foreign and security policy and its motivation within NATO and the European 
Union through its discussion of the case studies of Poland's support of the United States 
in the war in Iraq and the tough negotiating position taken by Poland in the debates on the 
EU constitution.  Each of these cases provides further evidence of Polish security 
interests and the direction in which Polish security policy is being led.  Polish support of 
the war in Iraq is all about the solidarity that Poland's support represents.  It is a tangible 
demonstration of Poland's willingness to honor its commitments.  At the same time, there 
is the hope that, when Poland requires assistance, the United States will remember 
Poland's support in Iraq and honor its own commitments to Poland. 
The debate on the EU constitution represents Poland's insistence that its interests 
be considered.  In order to influence the European Union and ensure that its voice is 
heard, Poland has demonstrated that it will defend its interests and will not subordinate 
them as a matter of course to those of other states.  In the end, the Polish position 
maintained in the negotiations of the EU constitution revealed Poland's determination to 
play a central role in further EU integration and to represent the concerns of its less-
powerful neighbors. 
Finally, while many political scientists point to the importance of domestic 
politics in the shaping of foreign and security policies, this issue has been of little 
significance in the case of Poland.  Chapter II will describe how, since 1989 and the work 
of Poland's first foreign minister, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, a consensus has been at work 
among all political parties.  Across the spectrum and including the government and the 
responsible opposition, accord has reigned with regard to Poland's foreign and security 
policy objectives and how best to achieve them--there is no United States-Europe 
cleavage in Polish political circles.  While the politicians worked to bring Poland into the 
West's political, economic, and security structures, the Polish public has largely remained 
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absorbed in its own economic well-being and has been satisfied to leave issues of foreign 
and security policy to its experts. 
C. POLISH SECURITY POLICY IN HISTORY 
In 1989, following the collapse of the Iron Curtain, Poland's initial foray into the 
newly-emerging international community dictated that Poland take stock of its foreign 
and security policy and begin the political debates to determine the direction it would 
take.  Central to any political debate in Poland at this time concerning its foreign and 
security policy was Poland's history.  Two themes have largely dominated Polish foreign 
and security policy—Poland’s historic struggle to defend itself from the superpowers to 
its east and west, and the unreliability of Poland's European allies to defend it against 
these perceived threats.   
1. Traditional Enemies 
Writer Norman Davies refers to Poland as "God's Playground," an apt moniker 
when one considers Poland's history of subjugation and occupation.  In the 18th Century, 
between 1772 and 1795, Poland was partitioned on three occasions by Russia, Prussia, 
and Austria and eventually ceased to exist as a state.  Though Poland emerged as an 
independent state after the First World War, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact would result in 
the fourth partition of Poland with the invasions of Germany and the Soviet Union. 
2. Unreliable Allies 
An equally troubling trend in Poland's history is the unreliability of its European 
allies.  Beginning with the partitions of Poland in the 18th Century, Europe appeared to 
give implicit support to the actions taken by Prussia, Russia, and Austria in eliminating 
Poland as a state.  The rest of Europe seemed self-absorbed and generally unconcerned 
with the fate of Poland.  During the Polish-Soviet War in 1920, Poland’s allies were 
unwilling to make firm promises to defend Poland in the event Russia attacked.  In fact, 
in several cases, British politicians were more suspicious of Poland’s actions and motives 
than they were those of Russia.  Another issue worrisome to Marshal Jozef Pilsudski and 
Poland was the Western European powers' reaction to the Rapallo Treaty signed by 
Russia and Germany in 1922.3  Ilya Prizel, in his book, National Identity and Foreign 
                                                 
3 The Treaty of Rapallo normalized diplomatic relations between Russia and Germany and signaled 
their renunciation of all territorial and financial claims from the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the First World 
War. 
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Policy, describes a recommendation concerning France's relationship with Poland made 
by Marshal Foch during a visit to Warsaw in which he “suggested that Paris' military 
commitments to Poland should be modified in case of German aggression and should be 
inoperative regarding Russia.”4  This suggestion was met with great disdain by Polish 
politicians, as was the achievement of the Locarno Agreement in 1925, in which Poland 
still received no guarantees of their western border with Germany. 5 
Ultimately, however, the best example of Europe’s failure to defend Poland is the 
European reaction to Hitler’s expansionist policies.  The policy of appeasement 
demonstrated by Chamberlain and Daladier at Munich in 1938 illustrated to Poland that 
Eastern Europe was nothing more than a “bargaining chip” that Western European states 
were more than willing to wager in order to prevent the possibility of war with Hitler.  
Though the British responded to Poland shortly thereafter with a promise of support, 
when Hitler invaded in September 1939, the promise was not kept (something that Hitler 
had expected all along) and Poland left to defend itself—in this case from threats in both 
the West and the East. 
Given this history, it is understandable why, after nearly 50 years of Soviet 
domination, Poland would emerge with a unanimous foreign and security policy that was 
Western-oriented.  While the government engaged in providing for the security of the 
Polish state, its people, solidly behind their politicians, turned to improving their lives.  In 
the realm of domestic politics, the consensus achieved in Poland's first democratically-
elected government continues today.  At the same time, their people continue to pay little 
attention to those issues, especially in the international arena, that only minimally impact 
their daily lives. 
                                                 
4 Ilya Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 
71. 
5 The Locarno Treaties, signed on October 16, 1925, included seven agreements between Britain, 
France, Germany, Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Italy that served to guarantee Germany's western 
border and to move toward a normalization of relations in the region. 
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II. POLISH FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY:
 DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS? 
 
Political scientists often point to domestic political constraints to explain the 
foreign policy positions of politicians and policymakers.  Among policymakers, domestic 
politics often plays a central role in determining their particular stance on an issue.  
Choices regarding a particular foreign policy issue, available to a particular politician, are 
tools with which he can woo voters and attract support.  In Poland, however, since 1989, 
there have been few domestic political constraints related to foreign and security policy 
issues.   This chapter will demonstrate that this domestic political consensus has endured, 
even as the rift between the United States and Europe appeared, and continues today.  
Evidence of this is apparent, first, in the broad support of Poland's political parties for the 
government's policy decisions, and, ultimately,  is quite visible in the general indifference 
of its public toward foreign policy issues. 
Following the election of its first democratic government, a consensus emerged 
with regard to Poland's foreign and security policy priorities.  After more than 50 years of 
Soviet subjugation, Poland needed to integrate into the economic, political, and security 
institutions of the West.  Poland had to join the European Union and NATO.  Equally 
important was the establishment of a close bilateral relationship with the United States.  
Beginning with Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski, the Polish government began 
its work toward achieving membership in the European Union and NATO.  This 
consensus continued throughout the 1990s and still exists today.  Ilya Prizel and Andrew 
Michta make this clear when they contend that "[f]oreign policy is the single issue on 
which Poland's fractious and divided political scene has managed to reach a lasting 
consensus."6 
A. POLITICAL PARTIES 
Since 1989, domestic politics has not significantly limited the formulation of a 
Polish foreign and security policy.  Polish political parties, including the governing 
coalition and the responsible opposition have continued to agree on the general track of 
                                                 
6  Ilya Prizel and Andrew A. Michta, eds., Polish Foreign Policy Reconsidered  (New York:  St. 
Martin's Press, 1995), 23. 
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this policy.  While there has been some rhetorical criticism, this is largely for domestic 
consumption and is related to the way a decision is carried out more than about how.  
According to a US government official in Europe, the government's main opposition has 
continually referred to three issues in its disapproval of the current government--the poor 
way in which the Polish government has carried out the deployment of troops in support 
of the war in Iraq, the poor implementation of the offset agreements associated with the 
F-16 fighters purchased from the United States by the Polish government, and the 
ineffective negotiations carried out by the government to achieve a revocation of the US 
requirement of visas for Polish citizens.  In each of these cases, there is no criticism of 
the government's general decision.  Disagreement is related to the implementation of 
these decis ions.  Ultimately, even this criticism is only meant to serve to differentiate the 
stance of the opposition from that of the government.  According to the American 
official, the opposition parties have reassured him continually that their criticism on the 
three issues above is merely a matter of "politics," rather than a substantive disagreement  
In the end, the opposition is well aware that it would face the same obstacles and 
circumstances were it in power. 
The government and the opposition have been ardent supporters of Poland's 
membership in the European Union and NATO, and its close relationship with the United 
States.  All political parties supported the government's resolute stance in opposition to 
the EU constitution.  When Prime Minister Leszek Miller first traveled to Brussels in 
December 2003, he did so with the support of all parties who agreed that Poland was best 
served in a European Union whose decisions were made according to the voting weights 
under the Nice Treaty.  Following the Foreign Minister's policy address to the Sejm in 
January 2004, leader of the opposition party Law and Justice Jaroslaw Kaczynski 
"praised the government for the tough stance it presented at the Brussels summit."7  In 
Kaczynski's own words:  "'You have served Poland well, gentlemen, and this is 
something worth saying even if one represents the staunch opposition.'"8  There was 
agreement that Polish interests required protection and that only by asserting itself would 
Poland be taken seriously and reckoned a political force on the European continent.  All 
                                                 
7  Warsaw Gazeta Wyborcza , 22 January 2004.  FBIS-EUP 20040123000014 (23 January 2004). 
8  Ibid. 
 9 
parties continue to understand the importance of EU membership and, while willing to 
fight for terms more advantageous to Poland, are unwilling to countenance the possibility 
of a Poland outside the European Union.9  There is widespread recognition that the 
European Union, through the Common Agricultural Policy and regional funds, will 
continue to benefit the Polish people.  According to the European Commission's 
representative in Poland, Bruno Dethomas, "Warsaw should receive 6.5 to 7 billion euros 
in net Community payments up to the end of 2006."10  While some of the parties of the 
responsible opposition are somewhat euroskeptic, their objections are related to the extent 
of integration.  The issue is a matter of degree vice integration itself.  Of the parties that 
are completely opposed to EU membership--Samoobrona (SO) and the League of Polish 
Families (LPR)--their opposition is based on their populist ideas that champion the 
isolationism of Poland.  Neither of these parties, however, represents responsible 
opposition parties since they criticize the policies of the government, without offering 
their own viable solutions.  Samoobrona and the League of Polish Families oppose the 
government for the sake of opposition, rather than presenting other possible policies.  In 
late 2004, for example, the LPR, which had been staunchly opposed to the EU 
constitution even after the government eventually agreed to sign, sought to try the Polish 
prime minister because he signed a constitution that violated the Polish constitution.  
Expressing his party's position, LPR leader Roman Giertych accused the prime minister 
of accepting a document that "'deprived Poland of even a shadow of influence on EU 
affairs, promoted libertarian ideas which have caused much harm in Europe, put Europe 
under the control of the French-German tandem and ran against the Polish constitution by 
putting EU jurisdiction above Polish laws.'"11  Samoobrona, for its part, is not opposed to 
the European Union, but would seek to renegotiate the accession treaty.  Andrzej Lepper, 
the charismatic leader of Samoobrona, spelled out his party's stance prior to Poland's 
ratification of the accession treaty in May 2003 during a visit to the European Parliament.  
                                                 
9  For a better understanding of party politics and Poland's progression toward EU membership, 
consider Grzegorz Pozarlik's chapter entitled "Polish Political Parties and a Discourse on Polish Raison 
d'etat on the Eve of EU Membership" in Between Animosity and Utility:  Political Parties and Their 
Matrix, Hieronim Kubiak and Jerzy J. Wiatr, eds. (Warsaw:  Wydawnictwo Naukowe SCHOLAR, 2000) 
10  Paris La Tribune, 6 June 2003.  FBIS-EUP 20030606000156 (6 June 2003). 
11  Warsaw PAP, 29 October 2004.  FBIS-EUP 20041030000034 (30 October 2004). 
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Lepper asserted that "if the conditions [of accession] do not change, the new government 
created by his party, will force its way out of the EU."12  Although Samoobrona has 
never been a member of any ruling coalition in Poland, his statement reflects the sort of 
policy that he would strive to implement were Samoobrona afforded the opportunity. 
The debate surrounding Poland's relationship with the United States illustrates the 
same political pattern.  Beginning in 1989 with the Solidarity government of Lech 
Walesa, Polish political parties agreed that Poland should seek a close relationship with 
the United States.  They each realized that the United States was largely responsible for 
the victory in the Cold War, and Poland's reemergence as an independent state.  Early on 
this agreement was nearly unanimous, even among the Polish populace.  Only after the 
government came out in support of the war in Iraq, was one able to sense a weakening of 
this popular support.  In the post 9/11 era and the lead-up to the war in Iraq, there was 
widespread political support of the US position.  Polish opposition parties understood the 
benefits to be gained and the obligations their participation would accomplish.  Despite 
the fact that the decision was one taken by the executive leadership and not the Sejm, 
Poland's politicians accepted the risks involved and recognized the wisdom of the 
decision.  Again the only steadfast and unequivocal opposition to a close relationship 
with the United States is presented by Samoobrona and the League of Polish Families.  
They are the only parties that have demanded the immediate withdrawal of Polish troops 
from Iraq and have been the most radical and vocal in their opposition of the 
government's decision to deploy troops in support of the United States.  When the Sejm 
adopted the President's decision to deploy troops in support of the war in Iraq, the LPR 
deemed the act unconstitutional.  In the minds of its members, the President and the 
government were obligated to seek the Sejm's authority before deploying troops.  On 20 
March 2003, the day after the government informed the Sejm of its decision, the LPR's 
leader, Roman Giertych charged that "if [Polish President] Aleksander Kwasniewski and 
[Prime Minister] Leszek Miller made such a decision on their own, they broke the basic 
law."13  Other parties in the opposition defended the government's actions.  Further 
demonstrating the populist tendencies of the LPR was Giertych's call for a referendum on 
                                                 
12  Brussels EUObserver, 9 May 2003.  FBIS-EUP 20030509000045 (9 May 2003). 
13  Warsaw Zycie Warszawy, 20 March 2003.  FBIS-EUP 20030323000328 (20 March 2003). 
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the presence of Polish troops in Iraq in August 2004.  Although there is no doubt that 
many Poles agree with the questions posed by the LPR and Samoobrona given the lack of 
popular support for the maintenance of Polish troops in Iraq, this sort of appeal 
demonstrates a general lack of understanding of the political implications of such a 
proposed withdrawal on the future of Polish foreign, as well as security, policy. 
While the responsible opposition seeks to criticize the government's failure to 
properly implement its foreign and security policies, the LPR and Samoobrona continue 
to criticize issues, such as the terms of the accession treaty and Poland's involvement in 
Iraq, to peel voters away from the other parties.  To some extent, they have been 
successful, but there is little doubt that, while they have nothing to lose in opposing the 
government, it is highly unlikely that they could afford to make a decision different from 
that taken by the current government.  Poland's responsible opposition parties have 
avoided the positions adopted by the LPR and Samoobrona, realizing their lack of 
credibility. 
B. THE PUBLIC 
Though the government and the opposition continued to support close ties with 
the United States, to include deploying Polish troops in support of the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the people were unwilling to support a relationship requiring them 
to possibly sacrifice their sons.  Polls throughout 2003 and 2004 by TNS OBOP, the 
Polish international market research company, continued to reveal an overwhelming 
rejection of the government's deployment of Polish troops to Iraq.  According to results 
published by the Polish Press Agency in September 2004, the lack of support for the 
mission in Iraq had grown to 71 percent of those polled, against only 23 percent that 
believed that the mission was a good idea.14  Though the polls expressed the popular 
discontent with the war, the Polish penchant for demonstrations was never evident in 
anywhere near the way it was in the early 1980s and the days of the Solidarity movement.  
Perhaps because of this fact, the government and the responsible opposition parties were 
never compelled to consider changing their stance.  No change in position was apparent 
and most parties agreed that any attempt to withdraw their forces as Spain had done 
                                                 
14  Warsaw PAP, 22 September 2004.  FBIS-EUP 20040922000235 (22 September 2004). 
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following the Madrid bombing could demonstrate weakness and put Poland at risk.  The 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service reports the reaction of one Polish politician.  
According to Marek Jurek of the Law and Justice Party (PiS): "In the wake of the Madrid 
attacks, any sign of wavering is dangerous."15  He goes on to assert that "Poland's 
security 'depends on universal security,' therefore 'Poland should continue to support the 
United States.'"  Had there been large, and possibly violent, protests, there is little doubt 
that politicians would have had to consider altering their position to protect national 
stability.  Much like the American public, the Polish population is absorbed primarily by 
their economic well-being and that of the Polish state.  Those Poles that are specifically 
impacted by foreign policy decisions have an interest in these policies, while those that 
do not--also like Americans--do not pay them much attention. 
The Polish electorate is largely disinterested in politics.  As Marjorie Castle and 
Ray Taras explain in Democracy in Poland, “With the exception of the June 1989 semi-
free parliamentary elections—few people realized at the time that it would prove so 
historic—when 63 percent of voters cast ballots, successive parliamentary elections have 
generally drawn about one-half of the electorate to the polling stations.”16  Though the 
Polish President is largely a figure-head and plays a limited role in advancing legislation, 
Poles also are more inclined to vote in presidential rather than parliamentary elections.  
Those Poles that are interested in politics are more attuned to domestic developments and 
much less interested in the foreign policy of their government or the foreign policy votes 
of their adopted party.  Equally troublesome is Poland’s high voter volatility and low 
party identification.  According to Janina Paradowska and Jerzy Baczynski in their 
article, “Voters Without a Choice:” “Although parties try to appeal directly to the 
population, they are nevertheless generally weekly (sic) rooted in the field (only one 
percent of Poles surveyed reported that they belong to any sort of party).”17  Castle and 
Taras cite a study of the 1993 and 1997 Polish parliamentary elections that found that “58 
percent of voters switched their support and only 23 percent cast ballots for the same 
                                                 
15  Polish Press Highlights, 22 March 2004. FBIS-EUP 20040322000278 (22 March 2004). 
16  Marjorie Castle and Ray Taras, Democracy in Poland (Boulder, CO:  Westview Press, 2002), 164.  
These swings have been attributable in the past to discontent with the economic program of the ruling 
party. 
17 Warsaw Polityka, 24 April 2004. FBIS-EUP 20040424000312 (24 April 2004). 
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party or its successor.”18  Though Poland has a history, as in the Solidarity movement, of 
popular protests as a means of influencing politics, this phenomenon has declined since 
the days of Solidarity.  From its height in 1993, when there were 7,443 strikes in Poland, 
encompassing 383,000 workers, strikes as a means of influencing politics have dropped 
considerably.  “From 1995 on there were never more than 42 strikes in any given year 
and never more than 44,000 workers were involved.”19  This is attributable, in large part, 
to improving labor and economic conditions, as well as to the passage, in 1991, of 
arbitration and negotiations legislation.  Those demonstrations that take place in Poland 
today are related to economic conditions or are a reaction to a particular government 
policy that has adversely affected a certain sector of the economy.  In any case, the Polish 
electorate has generally withdrawn from politics and certainly continues to play an 
extremely minor role in Polish foreign policy decisions. 
With a public that is uninterested in international politics, Poland's politicians 
have little to worry about in making foreign policy decisions.  The Polish government's 
adoption of stances that have at one time been opposed by a large segment of the Polish 
population is demonstrative of this fact.  Given the agreement among the government and 
its opposition regarding foreign and security policy decisions, there can be little doubt 
that neither group is willing to change its position simply to match that of the Polish 
public because they understand the potential consequences of such a decision.   
There is agreement among the government and the opposition about the direction 
that Polish foreign and security policy should be moving and the position to be taken by 
Poland.  This is certainly visible in the decision made, beginning in 1989, to apply for 
membership in both NATO and the European Union.  At that time, Polish politicians 
understood the uncertain situation in which the state found itself.  Recognizing the 
promise offered by Western institutions, Poland sought to achieve the benefits of 
political, economic, and defense integration. 
                                                 
18   Castle and Taras, 169. 
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III. THE EU AND NATO:  POLISH SECURITY AIMS AND 
POLISH SECURITY OPTIONS 
US scholar, Andrew Michta, asserts that with the end of the Cold War and 
following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in July 1991, Poland was compelled “to 
come to grips with the historical problem of being a medium-sized and relatively weak 
nation facing stronger and potentially dangerous neighbors.”20  To that end, Polish 
policymakers laid out four goals for Poland.  The first two aimed to ensure Poland's 
independence and to wrench Poland loose of Russian hegemony.  These objectives were 
pursued by supporting Russian democratization and decentralization, while at the same 
time settling relations with Germany and Poland's German minority.  The final two goals-
-establishing “full sovereignty in the international arena” and “gradually realigning 
Poland with Western Europe”--would require integration with the West.21  Polish 
policymakers believed it important to assure Poland's long-term economic prosperity, an 
objective that could only be realized through Poland's integration into Western Europe, in 
this case, through membership in the European Union.22  Ultimately, however, Poland 
required a security guarantee to remove itself from its historical role as “the perennial 
weak leg of the Berlin--Warsaw--Moscow triangle.”23  Achievement of this object, 
according to Polish officials, required Poland to join the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) at the earliest possible moment. 
While Poland's desire to join these two multi-national organizations was certainly 
based on their ability to suit Poland's needs, Poland's assessment of this ability was 
largely created by their perceptions of these institutions' successful performances during 
the Cold War.  The European Union and NATO were organizations created during the 
                                                 
20 Andrew A. Michta, “Safeguarding the Third Republic: Security Policy and Military Reform,” in 
Polish Foreign Policy Reconsidered, Ilya Prizel and Andrew A. Michta, eds. (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1995), 74. 
21 George Sanford, Poland: The Conquest of History (Singapore: Overseas Publishers Association, 
1999), 82. 
22 Prizel, 110. 
23 Ibid. 
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Cold War in response to specific needs on the European continent.24  The European 
Union was established to promote improved trade and economic relations between the 
states of western and central Europe to promote stable political relations.  The impetus 
that drove the process was a desire to put to rest once and for all the animosity between 
France and Germany that had characterized their relations since the middle of the 18th 
Century.  NATO, on the other hand, was a security regime that united much of Western 
Europe in defense against the possibility of a communist attack.  During the Cold War, 
these two organizations were mutually exclusive and served distinct purposes.25  The 
European Union was a customs union that served to unite the economies of its members 
and provide for their economic prosperity.  Despite the future development of the 
Western European Union as the defense and security arm of the European Union, security 
on the European continent was the exclusive realm of NATO.  Within NATO, and within 
the non-communist areas of Europe, there was agreement concerning the overarching 
threat against which NATO's capabilities were to be directed--imperialism of the Soviet 
Union and the Warsaw Pact. 
In light of the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the 
emergence of new threats in the post-9/11 era, Poland is discovering a political landscape 
in which the European Union and NATO are no longer mutually exclusive institutions, 
and the United States and Europe are no longer in agreement regarding the nature of 
today's threats or how best to meet them.  As a member now of both the European Union 
and NATO, Poland is engaged in a new “balancing act,” measuring its steps in both 
organizations in order to maintain productive relations with those states that occupy the 
leading positions in both the European Union and NATO.  How does Poland view its 
security with respect to each of these organizations?  A choice may now be facing Poland 
on which it must wager its security:  Europe or the United States?  The European Union 
or NATO? 
                                                 
24 For the purposes of this paper, the EU will be used in lieu of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) and European Economic Community (EEC), which will be understood in the given 
context of the time period. 
25 While both organizations focused on uniting, as much as possible, Europe, the EU and NATO went 
about it through different means--the EU was more concerned in bringing Europe together through 
economic ties, while NATO was more interested in uniting them defensively, through security ties. 
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While most Polish politicians would prefer not to choose between the European 
Union and NATO, the rift caused by the Iraq War has caused many experts to consider 
the possibility.  At this point, however, there is not much of a choice.  While the 
European Union's defense capabilities are still wanting and the organization's military 
will still largely lacking, NATO's capabilities remain dominant and on-call (largely 
because of the presence of the US military), though the organization's will to engage with 
its forces is waning.  For the foreseeable future, Poland will continue to depend on the 
security guarantees of NATO.  Until the European Union has a capable, willing force on 
which Poland can rely, Poland will continue to look to NATO and its promise of the 
United States.  Poland will, however, continue to explore its options.  Poland continues to 
demonstrate its trustworthiness and its solidarity with the United States in order to 
guarantee that, when the time comes, the United States will live up to its commitments to 
Poland as well.  At the same time, Poland is working to play a central role in the 
development of the European Union's security and defense policy to ensure that the 
policy that emerges takes Poland's security concerns into account and provides the 
resources and capabilities to make Europe a meaningful contributor to NATO's missions. 
A. JOINING NATO:  POLAND'S SECURITY BLANKET 
Even before the demise of the Warsaw Pact, Poland began exploring the 
possibility of NATO membership.  For Poland, more than anything else, NATO meant 
security.  Poland's desire for, and ultimately achievement of, NATO membership was 
based on the security guarantees inherent in the Washington Treaty.    In short, the NATO 
of which Poland envisioned becoming a member was the “traditional” NATO of the Cold 
War era.  Article 5 and its promise of collective defense, was, and remains, the critical 
component of Poland's national security.  According to Christopher Bobinski, the 
publisher of Unia and Polska, a Polish magazine dedicated to European Union issues, 
“Poles wanted NATO membership first and foremost as a guarantee of security against a 
possible resurgence of Russian territorial ambitions.  This explains why article 5 of the 
NATO treaty is sacrosanct for Poles.  That they interpret article 5 as an automatic 
commitment by all NATO members to go to the armed defense of any member which is 
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attacked is clear.”26  NATO membership, to a large extent, satisfies Poland's security 
concerns and allows Poland to focus more widely on its interna tional relations. Robert 
Kupiecki, a representative in Poland's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, believes that “NATO 
membership strengthens Poland's security and external position and widens its room of 
manoeuvre in international politics.”27  The crucial issue here, however, is NATO's 
evolution since the end of the Cold War, its new commitment to “out-of-area” operations, 
and the emergence of new, often non-state threats that now occupy NATO's attention.  
Though Article 5 has diminished in importance, its promise of support, especially from 
the United States, ensures Poland that the United States will remain committed to Europe 
and will continue to influence events on the continent. 
Polish politicians, in their discussions of NATO, emphasize the importance of 
American involvement on the European continent.  Kupiecki identifies the importance of 
this issue, when he notes that “[a]llied relations with the US, including the American 
presence in Europe, remain the essential component of the security of Poland and the  
entire continent.  Their institutional content is unchangeably best epitomized by 
NATO.”28  American leadership provides the security that Poland desires.  Journalist 
Elizabeth Pond elaborates on this idea in her assertion that  
The final distinctive characteristic of the United States as leader of NATO 
is the reassurance that American dominance provides for new democracies 
in central Europe.  Poland, the largest of the three freshman members 
admitted to the alliance two weeks before the war in Kosovo began, would 
have been leery of entrusting its security to an alliance led by Germany--
and without tacit American oversight it would also have been reluctant to 
accept reconciliation and a beneficial special relationship with Germany in 
the early 1990's.29 
Further evidence of this position was presented in 1996 at a regional security conference 
by the then-Polish Foreign Minister, Janusz Onyszkiewicz, who “defined Poland's 
                                                 
26 Christopher Bobinski, “Polish Illusions and Reality,” in Ambivalent Neighbors, Anatol Lieven and 
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28 Ibid. 
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interest in NATO from a pan-European perspective:  first and foremost, NATO 
guaranteed the continued political and military presence of the US in Europe--a fact that 
'has enormous significance for the sense of stability [and] security of many European 
nations.'“30  American presence and influence in Europe is central to the Polish idea of 
European security. 
Poland's concept of European security is also a concept of security achieved 
through a mutual agreement among states.  American involvement in Europe and the 
existence of NATO is necessary to prevent the resurgence of individual national security 
policies, such as those that were largely responsible for the world wars of the 20th 
Century.  Onyszkiewicz spelled out the importance of this consensus regarding European 
security policy when he announced:  “And I need not say how enormous the significance 
of this process of the internationalization of security policy has been, [or] how negative 
the consequences of a reversal of this process and a return to individual [national] 
security policies would be.”31  Though Onyszkiewicz fails to specifically address the 
issue, Europe's propensity for conflict, demonstrated perfectly in the prelude to the two 
world wars, requires a common security policy.  NATO provides this requirement and 
promotes stability in Europe by serving as a multinational forum for resolving differences 
and reaching a consensus on issues of concern to alliance members. 
In the early 1990's, there was little expectation that NATO would necessarily 
admit new members, least of all many of the former Warsaw Pact nations that found 
themselves trying to reform their militaries to make them more efficient and much less 
cumbersome and costly.  Few would have considered that, by 1999, NATO would have 
three new members including Poland.  Poland's quest to achieve the security guarantees it 
required would follow a winding road.  The tenacity with which Poland pursued NATO 
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1. Achieving the Objective 
Support of NATO membership started at the very top of the Polish political 
system, most notably with Poland's first democratically elected president, Lech Walesa, 
and his foreign minister, Andrzej Olechowski.  Among the reasons that served as the 
impetus for Poland's appeal for NATO membership, the most important was outlined 
during a December 1993 visit by Olechowski to Washington, D.C.  In a speech to the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Olechowski asserted that “Warsaw 
considers American engagement in NATO as well as Poland's eventual inclusion in the 
alliance a sine qua non of its continued independence.”32  At the time, Olechowski 
considered only temporary the relative calm that prevailed in Eastern and Central Europe-
-it was merely the product of the protracted political conflict taking place in Russia, and 
Germany's preoccupation with domestic matters related to unification.   
German unification presented its own set of unique problems to Polish security.  
Immediately following the Second World War, Poland had welcomed the separation of 
Germany between the two rival camps.  Having been given possession of the “Recovered 
Territories,” Poland was tied to the Soviet Union for protection against potential German 
aggression aimed at reconquest.  In 1990, with Germany unified, Poland remained fearful 
that German revanchism would reemerge.  To prevent this prospect, Poland was not only 
anxious for its own future membership in NATO, but was also privately cheering for 
NATO to quickly ratify German unification.  As writer George Sanford explains: “Poland 
did not oppose German unification but wanted the new 79 million strong state and 
economic giant to be tied down to European security structures.”33 
Poland's path to NATO membership was not a smooth one.  The largest obstacle 
that served to detour Poland's path to NATO was Russia's objection.  While the North 
Atlantic Council and the American Congress debated the costs and benefits of NATO 
enlargement, Lech Walesa achieved a seemingly major agreement with Russian president 
Boris Yeltsin in which Russia apparently assented to Polish membership in NATO.  On 
August 25, 1993, according to the communiqué issued by the two heads-of-state, Walesa 
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and Yeltsin affirmed that “[i]n the long term, such a decision [to join NATO] taken by a 
sovereign Poland in the interests of overall European integration does not go against the 
interests of other states, including the interests of Russia.”34  Surprisingly, despite 
Yeltsin's apparent consent, many US policymakers were not immediately willing to offer 
NATO membership.  Instead, in January 1994, Poland, and many of the other former 
Warsaw Pact states, was offered membership in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
program.35  This was not the invitation Poland had been expecting.  Ronald Asmus, a 
past aide to both Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Deputy Secretary Strobe 
Talbott, maintains that Poland and its Eastern and Central European neighbors were 
disappointed because PfP “looked more like a potential dead end than a first step toward 
NATO membership.  It offered no commitment, plan, or roadmap for eventual NATO 
membership.”36  Many Polish policymakers came to view the idea of PfP with hostility 
and as a “second Yalta.”37  More than anything, PfP did not address Poland's security 
needs.  In response to the offer of PfP membership, Poland and its American connections 
mounted a blitz to pressure the Clinton Administration into providing guarantees leading 
toward eventual NATO membership.  Polish-Americans lobbied Congress; Zbigniew 
Brzezinski applied pressure to the National Security Advisor, Tony Lake; and, a former 
hero of the Polish Underground, Jan Nowak, made his case to the media for Polish 
membership in NATO.38  Ultimately, Poland presented the United States with an 
ultimatum:  if the Clinton Administration made it clear that PfP was a path to NATO 
membership, PfP would become Poland's number one priority.  If not, Poland would 
offer no political support of the program.  As Polish Foreign Minister, Andrzej 
Olechowski announced publicly when he returned to Warsaw from a visit to the United 
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States in December 1993, “Poland would not sign PfP if it was 'just a second Yalta.'“39  
In response, in January 1994, President Clinton announced at a meeting “with the four 
Visegrad heads of state that NATO enlargement was no longer a question of 'whether' but 
'when' and 'how.'“40 
Beginning in 1994, however, Poland began to demonstrate its own lack of 
preparation for NATO membership.  Principal among the issues facing Poland was its 
lack of effective civil-military relations, best exemplified by President Walesa's treatment 
of the military and his defense ministry.  Walesa treated the Polish military as an interest 
group whose loyalties belonged to him.  Throughout 1994 and 1995, Walesa replaced no 
fewer than four defense ministers and demonstrated an unwillingness to subordinate the 
military to a civilian defense minister.  In the fall of 1994, in what came to be known as 
the Drawsko-Pomorskie Affair, Walesa met with a host of the military's most senior 
generals and his Defense Minister, Admiral Piotr Kolodziejczyk, at the Drawsko military 
training ground.  At a dinner in which all of the participants listed above were present, 
Walesa proceeded to poll the generals regarding the competence of the Defense Minister.  
All of the generals were critical of Kolodziejczyk's performance.41  The result betrayed 
the remarkable rift between the military and its defense ministry leadership and provided 
further evidence of Walesa's attempt to maintain control of the military within the office 
of the Polish President.  Despite several other setbacks over the course of the next three 
years, the Polish Sejm and Walesa's successor, Aleksander Kwasniewski, committed the 
state to civil-military reforms and brought about several changes that would finally place 
the state firmly on the road to NATO membership.  By July 1997, and NATO's Madrid 
Summit, Poland joined Hungary and the Czech Republic in being invited to become 
members of NATO's first round of enlargement. 
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2. The Benefits of Solidarity 
In addition to the security guarantees that NATO membership garnered, Poland 
also benefited from the substantial funding provided by NATO to upgrade its facilities 
and infrastructure.  According to Jeffrey Simon, senior fellow at the National Defense 
University's Institute for National Strategic Studies, upon joining NATO in 1999, 
“Poland would be able to share in the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP), which 
in 1998 was $688 million (of NATO's total annual budget of $1.5 billion).”42  Even more 
significant was Poland's cut of those expenditures.  As Simon contends:  “Between 1999 
and 2008, NATO will spend roughly $650 million in Poland, while Poland's 
contributions would amount to roughly $200 million.  As a result of these NATO funds, 
Poland will spend twice as much on infrastructure than before.”43  Equally important is 
the access to technology afforded to Poland by its relationship with NATO and the 
increasing significance of interoperability and cooperation.  Poland's arms and 
ammunition manufacturers have found new partners in the NATO states and new markets 
in which to compete.  At the same time, Poland's military has gained access to the newest 
technologies in order to facilitate its interoperability with its NATO partners. 
Finally, Poland's quest for membership in NATO provided the crucial impetus 
necessary to reform its Cold War-era military.  Under the criteria required of prospective 
alliance members by the North Atlantic Council, Poland was prodded to radically reform 
its military.  According to NATO's website, future members must provide evidence of 
five requirements.  For Poland, the most important were the final two, which focused on a 
state's “ability and willingness to make a military contribution to the Alliance and to 
achieve interoperability with other members' forces;” and its commitment “to democratic 
civil-military relations and institutional structures.”44  While supporting NATO's 
operations and exercises, Poland has benefited from the military reforms that were 
spurred by their membership in the alliance.  Thanks in large part to the guarantees of the 
                                                 
42 Ibid, 97.  The NATO Security Investment Program is one which finances the installation and 
facilities necessary to support the roles of NATO's Strategic Commands deemed to exceed the requirements 
of individual member countries.  NATO Handbook  (Brussels:  NATO Office of Information and Press, 
2001), 206. 
43 Ibid. 
44 http://www.nato.int/issues/enlargement/in_practice.htm (Accessed 21 May 2005). 
 24 
treaty's Article 5, Poland has been able to significantly reduce its massive legacy forces 
of the Cold War days.  Instead of having to station countless forces along its borders for 
territorial defense, Poland has been able to reduce its numbers of homeland defense 
soldiers and has been able to focus on projecting its forces in operations in support of the 
alliance.  Poland has continued to move in the direction of creating a largely professional 
military.  Jeffrey Simon notes that “[a]t the end of 2003, Polish armed forces are to total 
150,000 soldiers (25,000 officers and 50,000 NCOs), of which 50 percent will be 
professional. ”45  This is a stark contrast, considering that, in 1989, the Land Forces alone 
totaled 310,000.46  Though Poland's military reforms are by no means complete, Poland 
continues to serve as an example of NATO membership's ability to successfully generate 
military and political reforms within a candidate state.47 
As a member of NATO, Poland has demonstrated a strong willingness to support 
NATO operations and has established a reputation as a reliable team player.  Poland 
believes that in order to rely on the promised support of allies, one must demonstrate 
one's own reliability.  Even before joining the Alliance, Poland deployed troops in 
support of NATO's Implementation and Stabilization Forces in Bosnia following the 
Dayton Peace Accords in 1995.48  Just two weeks after Poland had joined NATO, it was 
asked to support NATO's Operation Allied Force in Kosovo.  Though incapable of 
providing any direct tangible support for the bombing campaign that began in March 
1999, Poland supported the mission politically.  In the days leading up to NATO's 
decision to use force to prevent further Serbian aggression in Kosovo, Poland 
demonstrated that it would support the use of force even without a United Nations 
resolution authorizing it.  According to a statement issued by Polish Foreign Minister 
Bronislaw Geremek on the intervention in Kosovo: 
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[T]he best way to do it is when a mandate for such missions is issued by 
the Security Council on behalf of the United Nations.  At the same time, 
however (...) given the entire veto technology in the Security Council, one 
must make NATO's moves contingent on the votes of either Russia or 
China, or both, and that NATO's missions going beyond Article 5 in 
emergencies may be pursued by NATO when they are consistent with the 
principles of the United Nations Charter and are in the service of the 
values enshrined therein.49 
In the aftermath of Operation Allied Force, Poland demonstrated its readiness to be a 
dependable ally.  In June 1999, Poland deployed nearly 800 troops to serve as its initial 
contingent in NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR).  At the same time, Poland deployed 140 
troops for the Albanian Force (AFOR).50  Each of these commitments was not cheap, 
costing the Defense Ministry Z40 million and Z3 million, respectively.  While neither of 
these deployments enjoyed a majority of popular support, the government deemed them 
necessary demonstrations of Poland's commitment to its membership in NATO.  Even 
more indicative of Poland's recognition of its responsibilities were the changes to 
Poland's constitution that were required to permit the deployment of troops to Kosovo. 
In the post-9/11 era, Poland has continued to establish its credibility as a trusted 
member of the Alliance.  After NATO's announcement that it was invoking Article 5 of 
the Washington Treaty, Poland “pledged 300 troops to the US-led 'war on terrorism' in 
Afghanistan, a total that included special forces, chemical and biological warfare 
specialists and sappers.”51  Polish support continues in the war in Iraq.  While Poland 
only provided several hundred of their special forces of the Grupa Reagowania 
Operacyjno Mobilnego (GROM) in the initial invasion, the state continues to provide 
nearly 2,400 troops to Operation Iraqi Freedom.  In fact, Poland's commitment to the 
operation led to the decision to place Poland in charge of the Multinational Force (Central 
South)--a multinational contingent that includes forces from 16 other countries.  Thus far, 
Poland has executed four rotations of its forces.  Ultimately, since its accession as a 
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member of NATO, Poland has proven itself one of the most, if not the most reliable 
partner in the alliance.  The Polish Ambassador to the United States, Przemyslaw 
Grudzinski asserts that “'Poland has tried to utilise in the best way possible every 
opportunity to get closer to the alliance, to prove it could contribute to the strengthening 
of NATO's potential...to convince the alliance that we will be a provider, and not just a 
consumer, of stability and security both now and in the future.'“52 
The most important product of Poland's membership has been its treatment as an 
equal within the alliance.  While none would argue that some voices are not louder than 
others, Poland enjoys the same single vote that all other member states have.  As an 
organization that requires unanimity, Poland's vote is as important as that of the United 
States, the United Kingdom, etc.  Equal treatment is critical to Poland's idea of its own 
security.  As Olaf Osica asserts in his chapter, “In Search of a New Role:  Poland in 
Euro-Atlantic Relations:”  “[B]eing treated on a par with the old allies largely 
predetermines the sense of stability and hence security of Poland.  It was for this reason 
that, when Poland was applying for membership, so much emphasis was placed on 
making sure that there would be no 'second class' membership for the new allies.”53  An 
equal voice in the Alliance guarantees that Poland's security concerns will be heard and 
will be considered in any agreement to be reached among the allies. 
B. JOINING THE EU:  BACK IN EUROPE 
While Poland embraced the security guarantees offered by the West under the 
auspices of NATO, there was also a strong motivation within the populace and the 
political leadership to move the state closer to the political and economic structures of its 
European neighbors and to “rejoin” Europe.  Throughout the 1970's and 1980's, when 
Poland and the rest of Central and Eastern Europe continued to decline economically 
under communism, the European Coal and Steel Community had become the European 
Community and continued to prosper, expanding its borders on three occasions to include 
the majority of the rest of Western Europe.  With the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the 
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development of an independent Polish foreign policy, Poland looked to reunite with the 
rest of Europe and become a member of its dominant economic institution. 
Beginning in 1991, Poland applied for “association status” with what had recently 
become the European Union.  As with NATO initially, Poland was not immediately 
offered membership in the European Union.  Because of the European Union's 
experience in admitting Spain, Portugal, and Greece, there was little support within the 
EU member states for immediate enlargement to include the former Warsaw Pact states.  
As Peter A. Poole explains in Europe Unites: The EU's Eastern Enlargement :  “The 
addition in the 1980's of Spain, Portugal, and Greece had taught EU leaders that adding 
countries with weak political and economic systems was expensive and difficult.”54  
There was also no consensus among the EU member states as to which Eastern and 
Central European states should eventually be offered membership.  Each of the members 
had its own candidate whose membership it promoted, usually based on historical ties.  In 
this regard, Poland's candidacy was most strongly supported by Germany whose 
sponsorship arose from basic German security issues.  As a state whose eastern border 
was also that of the union, Germany would certainly benefit from any extension of that 
border.  At the same time, while sharing a border with Poland, it most certainly was 
important to German politicians that its eastern neighbor remain politically stable and its 
young democracy reinforced and protected--this would best be achieved by tying Poland 
to the institutions of the European Union. 
Even before Germany had made public its support of Polish membership, Polish 
leaders had already begun to express the indispensability of German support to Poland's 
goal of Western integration.  As early as 1990, Solidarity's weekly, Tygodnik 
Solidarnosc, was advocating rapprochement with Germany toward this end.  According 
to one of its articles, “'Poland, if she wants to meet the challenge of crossing the threshold 
of civilization, which is possible only through integration with Western Europe, must 
open itself to wide cooperation and involvement with Germany.'“55  Any European 
sponsor, however, was not sufficient--German support would provide the best prospect 
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for Polish integration in Europe.  Joshua Spero, in his book, Bridging the European 
Divide, contends that “Warsaw discerned that no other state other than Germany could 
assis t its European reintegration as effectively. ”56  When Poland and Germany signed the 
Treaty on Good Neighborly Relations and Friendly Cooperation on June 17, 1991, 
Poland finally achieved the settlement that Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski had 
envisioned in 1989 to anchor Poland to the West. 
1. EU Membership:  Financial Gains and a Seat at the Table 
While EU membership is considered an important route to “rejoining” Europe, the 
substantial financial benefits associated with the European Union played the major role in 
Poland's quest for membership.  Membership in the union would provide a much wider 
market for relatively inexpensive Polish goods and would offer Polish firms the same 
preferential trade relations provided to all union members.  The European Union also 
provided considerable subsidies to its member states.  In the 1980's under the 
Commission Presidency of Jacques Delors, the European Union began a program to 
redistribute wealth from the rich states to its poorer neighbors.  These “structural funds,” 
as they are collectively known, “were created to help the poor countries and regions.”57  
Principal among these was the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).  The CAP was 
adopted by the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and designed to protect the struggling agricultural 
sectors of the European Coal and Steel Community states.  Peter Poole asserts that the 
major aims of the CAP laid out in the treaty were:  “to raise agricultural productivity, 
ensure that farmers made a decent living, stabilize markets for farm produce, guarantee 
adequate food supplies, and ensure that the prices consumers paid for food were 
reasonable.”58  Over the years, the CAP has provided considerable money to the 
European Union's farmers and many of the EU states have grown accustomed to these 
finances.  With a large agricultural sector, Polish politicians expected that their poor 
farmers would benefit greatly from union accession, and the money these subsidies 
infused into the Polish economy would promote growth.  Poland's assessment of CAP 
was largely its view of EU membership.  Polish politicians understood that Poland's 
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struggling economy would benefit from the favorable terms and vast market offered by 
membership in the European Union and that Poland's weak economy would only achieve 
the dramatic growth necessary to approach the level of Europe's more successful 
economies by joining the European Union. 
Equally important to Polish politicians were the regional funds that would 
undoubtedly be distributed to Poland, due to its low standard of living.  To better 
understand Poland's place among its EU neighbors, consider the data provided by Konrad 
Szymanski, a Polish politician, in his article, “Nice Properly Counted.”  According to 
Szymanski: 
Of the 116 million citizens inhabiting regions in candidate countries in 
which the GDP is less than 75 percent of the EU-wide average (the 
threshold below which EU assistance is provided), as many as 60 percent 
are living in Poland. As many as 10 of the 13 poorest regions are in 
Poland, including Lublin Voivodship and the Subcarpathians, where the 
GDP is only 30 percent of the EU-wide average.59 
A widespread expectation of EU aid in support of Polish economic prosperity was the 
principal motivating factor behind Poland's pursuit of EU membership. 
Finally, Poland was also motivated to join Europe and the European Union by a 
desire to play a greater role on the European continent.  Among many Polish politicians 
there is a sense of Poland's historical importance to Europe.  As Judy Batt explains in her 
chapter entitled, “European Identity and National Identity in Central Europe:”   
The ambivalence of Polish intellectuals to the idea of 'central Europe' 
reflects not only the stronger conviction of Poland's historical and 
geopolitical importance to Europe, coupled with a more full-blooded 
romantic messianism, but also a lingering sense of Poland's other 'national 
mission' to the east, towards its neighbors which were once part of the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. 60 
Poland is interested in playing a role in the future of Europe.  As an insider and member 
of the European Union, Poland participates in the political debates that take place 
regarding the direction to be taken by the European Union and the decisions to be made.  
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As a member of the Visegrad Four 61, Poland has attempted to play the role of regional 
leader, in large part to protect the interests of its fellow Visegrad states and, more 
generally, the smaller member states of the European Union.  In fact, Poland's President, 
Aleksandr Kwasniewski, played a central role with the European Union's own Javier 
Solana in the diplomatic efforts undertaken in Ukraine to nullify the falsified presidential 
elections of 2005 and demand a new round. 
2. Poland's EU Membership:  Making Its Presence Felt 
Poland's experience, first as an associate member, then as a full member of the 
European Union has been dominated by hard-fought diplomacy and a balancing of 
“national interests” with the conditions of EU accession.  Though Poland eagerly 
anticipated many of the economic benefits that would accompany membership, the 
accession negotiations proved a bitter disappointment.  By the time Poland became a full 
member of the European Union, promises of substantial union financial assistance were 
largely unfulfilled as a result of the terms of the accession agreement. 
While Poland would receive assistance through the CAP, it would not receive 
nearly as much as the existing members of the European Union and the traditional 
recipients of this aid.  In fact, the ten countries that joined the European Union in May 
2004 were limited to 25 percent of those funds distributed as a maximum to the EU-15.  
The ten new members of the European Union will not be eligible for the full amount of 
possible CAP subsidies until 2013.  In Poland's case, only through painstaking 
negotiations was its EU Minister, Danuta Huebner, able to win for the country the right to 
subsidize its farmers over and above the level of aid received from the European Union's 
CAP in order to make Poland's farmers as competitive as their long-time EU 
counterparts.  In the end, however, these funds would only be allowed to rise 
incrementally and would remain substantially less than those received by the rest of the 
European Union.  According to the terms of Poland's accession agreement, Poland is only 
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permitted to “add additional funds from its own budget to bring the totals to 55% of the 
EU amount in 2004, 60% in 2005 and 65% in 2006.”62 
Equally troublesome are the immigration limitations imposed by the European 
Union on Poland and the other new members.  Out of fear for its individual states' labor 
forces, the European Union has limited the migration of its newest members' peoples, and 
is not allowing these states to join the Schengen Agreement which allows the free 
movement of people, goods, and services throughout the union.  Heather Grabbe 
describes this apparent double standard when she says that “some of the rules [of the 
European Union] are more equal than others.  Thus there has to be free movement of 
goods, services, and capital in central and eastern Europe, but the EU is not going to 
allow free movement of people from east to west immediately (even though free 
movement of workers is one of the four freedoms of the Single Market.”63  At the same 
time, Poland now finds itself on the border of the European Union and must now demand 
visas of its long-time trading partners in Ukraine and Belarus. These are just two 
examples of the apparent one-sided nature of negotiations with the European Union.  
Poland and its fellow newest members of the European Union have not entered the union 
as equals.  As Anatol Lieven asserts, “it seems likely that for a very long time after 
accession, the new members of the EU from eastern Europe will in fact be second-class 
members, visibly inferior to western Europeans not only in wealth, but in formal status 
within certain EU institutions.”64 
Closely related to this sense of inequality is the important fact that many issues 
determined by the European Commission no longer require unanimity.  As a result of the 
European Union's adoption of qualified majority voting, members no longer retain a veto 
over most policy issues.  In light of this fact, many apparent blocs have developed within 
the union.  There is also a sense that the larger states are determined to set the union 
agenda.  Poland, for one, is concerned that the Franco-German alliance is dictating the 
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European Union's political debate, largely without regard for the concerns and interests of 
its smaller fellow members.  In those cases where unanimity is required, as in the 
adoption of the union's draft constitution, disagreement or a perceived unwillingness to 
yield threaten to incur political isolation or economic sanctions.  In any event, there is a 
sense that the European Union is unable to speak with “one voice.”  Given this inability 
and the willingness of larger states of the European Union to speak for smaller ones, 
Poland is concerned that its interests will be subordinated.  Poland's obstinate response is 
then apparently not considered to be the result of a friendly disagreement, but is rather an 
intentional slight. 
3. Contributing to the European Union's Security and Defense Pillar 
In this context, given Poland's general disappointment  with the economic benefits 
it had expected to receive from the European Union, one would expect even less 
enthusiasm toward the European Union's proposal for a “European Security and Defense 
Policy”--an issue that never provided the basis for the European Union.  As expected, the 
European Union, and its nascent institutions to forge a common European security and 
defense policy, is not a widely accepted source of Polish security.  In fact, initially many 
Polish policymakers believed that the concept of a common European policy would cause 
problems in Euro-Atlantic relations.  Poles were skeptical when the European Union 
announced in 1999 its Helsinki Headline Goal to achieve a standing European rapid 
reaction force of some 60,000 troops by 2003.  Instead of focusing on creating its own 
capabilities, Poland believed that NATO already provided the required organization and 
the proper forum in which Europe could develop its defense capabilities.  Olaf Osica, a 
former research fellow at Poland's Center for International Relations contends that 
“Polish politicians believed that the best place to develop European capabilities in 
defence policy was within NATO and more specifically, within the context of the 
alliance's European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) that had been developing since 
the mid-1990s.”65  Reliance on existing structures within NATO would prevent the 
European Union from seeking to compete with NATO and putting transatlantic relations 
at risk.  Equally problematic for Poland was the possible confusion that could result from 
the redundancy inherent in the activities of the European Union and NATO.  According 
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to David H. Dunn, a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science and 
International Relations at the University of Birmingham in Great Britain, “for Warsaw 
the main concern is the creation of institutional ambiguity as to who would be responsible 
for a crisis in the Baltics, Kaliningrad, or over Belarus or Ukraine... [M]isunderstandings 
may result and decisions may be prolonged or postponed to the detriment of Polish 
security.”66  Though the call for using NATO's institutions for building European defense 
capabilities went unheeded, Polish policymakers began to believe, nonetheless, that 
improved capabilities would make European states better contributors to NATO and “a 
better partner for the United States.”67  Polish support for the European Union's European 
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) was based on an improved capability to support the 
United States--an assessment precipitated by Europe's apparent weakness in the 1990's in 
dealing with the Balkans diplomatically, at first, and then militarily as part of Operation 
Allied Force in Kosovo.  Marek Siwiec, the Polish Secretary of State and Head of the 
National Security Bureau, explains that Polish support of NATO's ESDI and the 
European Union's ESDP were predicated on the eventual benefit to European capabilities 
that these concepts would have.  As he asserts: 
Poland has supported the ESDI process since its inception, within the 
framework of NATO and, then, the Common European Security and 
Defence Policy (CESDP) of the European Union.  This is because we 
perceive this process as the best means of strengthening the Europeans' 
practical operational capabilities and, consequently, for strengthening the 
crisis prevention and response capabilities of the whole Euro-Atlantic 
community. 68 
Ultimately, however, Poles feared that ESDP would not amount to anything.  Osica 
contends that “Poland suspected that CESDP would remain 'a paper tiger', which would 
only substantially complicate relations within NATO and hence between Europe and the 
USA.”69 
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 At the same time, however, the fear exists in Poland that Europe's security and 
defense policy will develop into something contrary to Poland's expectations.  In the past, 
Germany and France have fostered close, personal bilateral relationships with Russia 
instead of seeking to develop a cohesive consensual one among its EU partners.  In the 
days prior to the start of the war in Iraq, the French, German, and Russian leaders met to 
discuss their common opposition to the American- led invasion.  From Poland's point of 
view this sort of meeting represents a potentially sinister version of the Weimar 
triangle70--only in this case, Russia has replaced Poland as the third leg in the triangle.  
Without considering the concerns of Poland and the Eastern and Central European states 
that were satellites of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, Germany and France 
demonstrate an insensitivity to their concerns that threatens the development of a 
European security and defense policy.  Bartlomiej Sienkiewicz of Poland's Center for 
Eastern Studies maintains in an article for the Polish newspaper, Rzeczpospolita, that 
"[t]his poses 'a potential threat to the cohesion of EU foreign policy,' and new EU 
member states will be 'the first to suffer.'"71 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
Poland joined NATO and the European Union expecting the same complementary 
institutions that they had viewed since their days as a satellite of the Soviet Union.  
Poland wagered its security on its membership in NATO, while the European Union 
would provide the economic and political association that would establish Poland's 
European credentials and help revive its flagging economy.  
In the end, however, due to the end of the Cold War and changing perceptions, 
Poland now finds itself as a member of a European Union engaged in deeper integration 
and desiring its own defense capability.  At the same time, Poland belongs to a NATO 
where the guarantees of collective defense fail to carry the same promises they did during 
the Cold War.  While Poland continues to consider that its security is guaranteed only 
through NATO, it finds itself more and more compelled to demonstrate its loyalty, not 
only to NATO, but also to the European Union.  Polish foreign policy decisions have 
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been made within this framework and reflected these realities.  Two of the more 
important policy decisions that best demonstrate this are Poland's decision to support the 
United States in Iraq and its firm, nearly immovable negotiating position on the EU 
constitution.  These two decisions reflect the balance that Poland is striving to achieve in 
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IV. BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE:  THE TENSION 
BETWEEN INTERESTS AND CAPABILITIES 
 
Numerous decisions taken by the Polish government recently have served to 
emphasize Poland's unique stance regarding both the United States and its European 
neighbors.  Principal among the events that best illustrate these positions are the Polish 
decision to participate in the coalition that intervened in Iraq in March 2003 and Poland's 
stubborn position in negotiating the EU draft constitution in December 2003 through June 
2004.  One might expect that the two decisions are inter-related and betray, in the end, a 
decidedly pro-United States and anti-European stance.  Such is not the case.  Poland is 
both pro-United States and pro-Europe.  The decisions were not made reflecting a choice 
between Europe and the United States, but rather due to Polish interests related to its 
bilateral ties with Europe and the United States. 
Poland's decision to support the United States in the war in Iraq was not an anti-
European statement.  Instead, it was based on Poland's reliance on the United States and 
its security guarantees.  Polish politicians realized that in order to ensure the reliability of 
these guarantees, Poland was compelled to demonstrate its own reliability and its 
solidarity with the United States--a point that is remarkably apparent when the issues 
surrounding Poland's decision to support the United States are considered.  The 
statements made by Polish politicians reflected their prevailing concern with ensuring 
Poland's security, rather than simply acting in opposition to the stated positions of France 
and Germany.  Poland's decision regarding Iraq, however, was not without its potential 
consequences as Poland was compelled to weigh its decision to go to war against its 
overriding interest in completing its return to Europe through membership in the 
European Union. 
While Poland's decision to support the United States in Iraq certainly compelled 
the state to consider its EU ties and future membership, Poland's intransigence in the 
European Union constitution negotiations did not involve any significant consideration of 
Poland's relationship with the United States.  The stance maintained by Poland in the 
negotiations on the constitution underscored Poland's resolve to play an influential role in 
the future of the European Union and in determining the course of EU integration.  The 
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stance reflected a consensus among Polish politicians that spanned the political spectrum 
from Poland's euroenthusiasts to its euroskeptics.  Poland's tough negotiating position 
was maintained despite the pressure applied by the European Union's largest countries.  
Though ultimately agreeing to the terms of the constitution, Poland achieved its aim of 
forcing its future EU partners to seriously consider its position and its interests. 
A. POLAND'S SUPPORT OF THE WAR IN IRAQ 
Among the most important foreign policy decisions made by Poland since it freed 
itself from Soviet domination is certainly the decision undertaken by Poland's President 
and Prime Minister in early 2003 to provide political and material support to the US 
invasion of Iraq.  While this sort of decision is indeed remarkable, it is even more so in 
light of the fact that Poland's view regarding the war departed from that of the leading 
members of the European Union--namely France and Germany.  The case provides an 
interesting situation in which Poland's choice was more than a simple decision about 
whether or not to go to war.  When the war began in March 2003, Poland had already 
signed the EU Accession Treaty the previous year, but its people had yet to vote for 
accession.  Poland was also still 14 months from actual EU membership.  The EU 
Parliament would vote on the Accession Treaty in April 2003 and the European Council 
made up of the current EU-15 would vote on accession shortly thereafter.  In light of 
these circumstances, one is left to wonder at the questionable logic of the Polish President 
and the Polish government in acting contrary to the outspoken wishes of the recognized 
leaders of the European Union.   
The decision made by President Kwasniewski and Prime Minister Miller to 
support the United States in opposition to their future EU partners tells us much about the 
significance Poland attaches to the concept of solidarity.  Despite its pending EU 
membership, Poland had much to gain by joining with the United States and the 
“coalition of the willing.”  At the heart of its decision, however, the Polish government 
made public references more to its idealistic ties to the United States and NATO, rather 
than the tangible benefits to be gained from their participation in the coalition. 
On 28 January 2003, US President George W. Bush delivered his State of the 
Union Address to the Congress.  After describing the findings of the United Nations and 
the International Atomic Energy Agency regarding Iraq's possession and adherence to the 
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development of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, Bush announced America's 
position:  “We will consult, but let there be no misunderstanding:  If Saddam Hussein 
does not fully disarm, for the safety of our people and for the peace of the world, we will 
lead a coalition to disarm him.”72 
On the other side of the Atlantic, there was considerable debate among members 
of the European Union and those that would soon be joining the union.  France and 
Germany headed the group that opposed military action against the Hussein regime, 
endorsing instead further inspections.  Among those that were more supportive of the 
hard- line American position that considered military intervention were Great Britain, 
Italy, and Spain.  Joining these states in their endorsement of the American stance was 
Poland. 
Poland's support of the US invasion of Iraq is linked with Poland's support of the 
United States in the aftermath of 9/11.  Polish reaction to the reporting of the terrorist 
attack against the United States was almost immediate and reflected Poland's solidarity 
with the United States.  In fact, on 12 September 2001, the head of Poland's National 
Security Bureau, Marek Siwiec announced that the 9/11 attack “was an attack on our ally, 
or an attack on us, and this is how we must react to it.”73  Polish politicians quickly 
expressed their outrage with regard to the attacks and their support of the United States.  
By 14 September, NATO had invoked Article 5.  On 18 September, the Polish Sejm 
adopted a resolution that declared the 9/11 terrorist attack as “an act of aggression against 
all countries which advocate freedom and democracy.”74  In a radio broadcast on the 
same day, Poland's future Defense Minister, Jerzy Szmajdzinski, then a member of the 
Sejm, declared that Poland was ready to fulfill its obligations in support of NATO's 
declaration of Article 5.75  Though Poland realized that its ability to support the United 
States was limited, it understood that what mattered most was being a reliable ally and 
providing whatever support it could muster.  Even if that support was simply political 
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support, the United States would understand that Poland was fulfilling its commitment as 
an ally.  In fact, as the head of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affa irs' Strategy and Policy 
Planning Department, Roman Kuzniar, asserted in October 2002:  Poland “gave its 
unconditional support to the US military operation in Afghanistan and at the same time 
expressed its readiness to fulfill the provisions of Article Five of the Washington 
Treaty.”76  By adhering to the spirit of Article 5 of the NATO treaty and providing 
whatever assistance it could muster, Poland was demonstrating the same dependability 
that it would expect of its fellow allies in the event that its security were threatened. 
The same situation was apparent regarding Poland's support of the US stance 
toward the Hussein regime in Iraq.  Poland separated its interest in European membership 
from its stance on armed intervention in Iraq.  In opposition to France and Germany, the 
Polish government was one of the most outspoken advocates of America's hard- line 
posture.  While Kuzniar was talking of Poland's support of the United States, Poland's 
President was proposing his own tough stance to bolster the American position.  In an 
interview on 11 October 2002, Kwasniewski announced that “'it is worthwhile to adopt a 
new, clear-cut, precise, and tough UN resolution to force Husayn to disarm himself, and 
specify consequences if that does not happen.'“77  The Polish President's request 
highlighted the importance of forcing Hussein to disarm.  In the end, Kwasniewski 
believed that in order to avoid war, Hussein had to disarm.  Poland's Foreign Minister, 
Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz went one step further by noting that Poland could conceivably 
support the use of force even without the authority of a UN resolution.  According to 
Cimoszewicz:  “We cannot rule out a crisis situation, which we do not want to face and 
which we would like to avoid, but we cannot rule out the possibility that under particular 
circumstances Iraq would be disarmed without the UN resolution. ”78  This statement, as 
much as any other, reflected the differences between the Polish position and that of the 
Germans and French who insisted that any armed intervention must be authorized by the 
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UN.  Fundamentally, this served to place Polish security interests at odds with Polish 
interests in EU membership. 
Opposition within Europe to a possible attack by the United States, though 
somewhat apparent in 2002, was more significantly marked in January 2003, when 
Gerhard Schröder and Jacques Chirac met at Versailles.  At the meeting, the two 
presumed to speak for Europe when they declared that they were in agreement on the Iraq 
crisis.  The Economist notes that "Mr. Schröder had made it clear that Germany would 
not back a UN resolution calling for war.”79  There was no discussion of their positions 
either with the remaining 13 members of the European Union or the 10 that were 
preparing for membership. 
The rift that has come to characterize transatlantic relations over the past two 
years erupted following President Bush's State of the Union address in January 2003.  
Setting forth his case for the Iraq crisis following the announcement of the opposing 
positions of the French and German governments, President Bush had little idea of the 
storm that was gathering.  Just two days after the President's speech, on 30 January 2003, 
an op-ed article appeared in the Wall Street Journal in which the leaders of eight 
European states endorsed Bush's position and placed themselves directly at odds with 
Chirac and Schröder.  What came to be known as the “Gang of Eight” letter was a call for 
Europe to remain united with the United States and a warning against the possible 
destruction of the transatlantic alliance by the Iraq crisis.80  Among those signing the 
letter were the leaders of five EU member states--Great Britain, Denmark, Italy, Portugal, 
and Spain--and the leaders of three candidate states--Czechia, Hungary, and Poland.  The 
letter was not welcomed in Paris or Berlin and was largely seen as a betrayal of EU unity.  
The brunt of the blame was, in fact, borne by the three candidate states, rather than the 
five current states. 
Troublesome as well was the publication of the “Vilnius Declaration” on 7 
February 2003, in which 10 Eastern European states announced their support of the  
information delivered by US Secretary of State Colin Powell to the UN and their support 
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of toppling the Hussein regime.  Included among these states were five candidate 
countries, two candidate countries whose accession was postponed, and three who did not 
even have candidate status.81  Given these two proclamations and their decidedly pro-
United States stance, a remarkable divide opened between those that backed US 
intervention and those more in favor of a “wait-and-see” approach.   For Poland, 
specifically, its signature among those of the "intervention camp" represented its decision 
to place greater emphasis on its security interests rather than Polish interests in the 
European Union. 
In light of the “gang of eight” letter and the Vilnius declaration, the response by 
the Franco-German camp was best exemplified in their reaction to Turkey's eventual 
invocation of Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty in the days leading up to the war in 
Iraq.82  Though the issue of Article 4 was considered by the North Atlantic Council as 
early as mid-January 2003, it had been put off due to the objections of France, Germany, 
Belgium, and Luxembourg that it was still too soon.  Because the issue was initially 
floated by the United States within NATO, the issue was not finally brought to a head 
until Turkey requested consultations under the auspices of NATO's Article 4 on 10 
February 2003.  In response, France, Germany, and Belgium used their veto to prevent 
NATO from preparing military assistance for Turkey since they believed that NATO's 
actions would serve to lead to war, rather than prevent it.83  The response, reported by 
Bartlomiej Sienkiewicz, a Polish foreign policy analyst, was that Poland would have to 
rethink its security relationship with Germany.  As Sienkiewicz asserted: 
For the past decade we assumed that the continental security interests of 
Poland and Germany were identical.  We saw Germany as a guarantor of 
stability because it was deeply rooted in NATO, pursued a pro-US policy, 
and was the chief advocate of Poland's membership in the European 
Union.  It now turns out this does not necessarily have to be the case.  Our 
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two countries are on opposite sides of the barricade in the European-US 
rift as well as in the internal rift in Europe.84 
Poland had long considered that reconciliation with Germany, achieved in June 1991 
with the signing of the Treaty on Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, had 
represented an acceptance of their common interests.  Instead, however, Poland was 
compelled to consider that it shared less with Germany than it had originally thought.  At 
the same time that Polish politicians came to this realization, the veto by France, 
Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg undermined Poland's confidence in the alliance's 
credibility to respond to its calls for assistance should the need arise. 
In the end, to overcome the European rift, the European Union convened an 
emergency meeting on 17 February 2003 to discuss its stance on Iraq.  While an 
agreement was reached in which the European Union would give UN weapons inspectors 
“'the time and resources the UN Security Council believes they need,'“ it also included a 
strong statement that “added that 'inspections cannot continue indefinitely.'“85  Both sides 
of the Iraq debate in the European Union could claim victory after the meeting, given the 
statement that emerged.  In actuality, however, the meeting solved nothing since the 
statement failed to set a time limit on the inspections.  Though one would anticipate that 
the emergency meeting helped to avert a crisis, a statement made by Jacques Chirac later 
that evening at dinner served to open anew the rift within the European Union.  
According to the transcript of Chirac's comments, in response to a question about what he 
would tell the European Union's candidate countries on the following day regarding the 
so-called “mini-crisis” the European Union had just struggled through, Chirac answered: 
Concerning, in any case, the candidate countries, I am not speaking of the 
countries that are not candidates, but the candidate countries, honestly I 
think their behavior was a bit ill-considered...If, on the first difficult issue 
that comes along, a country gives its opinion independently of the group it 
moreover wants to join, this is not a very responsible way to act.  In any 
case, it is not very polite.  I therefore think they missed a good opportunity 
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to keep quiet.  I would add that beyond the slightly ridiculous or infantile 
side of their action, it is dangerous.86 
Instead of capitalizing on the sense of agreement that had emerged from the 
meeting, Chirac's comments served to fan the flames.  The response of Poland's Deputy 
Foreign Minister, Adam Rotfeld, on the following day emphasized that “Poland and other 
states in our region also have the right to decide what is good for them and France should 
respect it and show an interest in why this position is different from its own.”87  The 
decision of whether or not to support the United States in Iraq was a sovereign one to be 
made by the Polish government.  Despite this fact, Poland had to weigh the possible 
consequences of any decision it might make and the potential that supporting the United 
States would serve to politically alienate Poland on the European continent. 
1. The Decision is Made  
When the Polish government made the decision to support the United States in 
Iraq, the decision was not initiated by the Sejm, but was made among the President, 
Aleksandr Kwasniewski, the Prime Minister, Leszek Miller, and the Foreign Minister, 
Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz.  Well before the decision was made, however, the Polish 
President was visiting the United States and making statements that left little doubt 
regarding Poland's participation in the event of conflict.  In a television interview in 
January 2003 after a meeting with President Bush, the Polish President let it be known 
that “potentially, our [Poland's] offer [of support in military action] already exists.”88  
Kwasniewski stressed the importance of UN to disarm Hussein if possible, but 
emphasized “[I]f after all the discussions and actions, and the exploitation of various 
possibilities, it comes to stand and fight, then we will do this.”89  Poland's participation in 
the “gang-of-eight” letter was further evidence of Warsaw's unconditional support of the 
US position. 
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On 18 March 2003, the Polish Foreign Minister announced that Iraq's failure to 
implement the conditions of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 would constitute legal 
grounds to the Polish government for armed intervention. 90  On the same day, President 
Kwasniewski delivered a speech that stressed Poland's readiness to go to war.  In a 
reference to Poland's experience with and opposition to appeasement, Kwasniewski 
asserted that “We remember those who at the time did not want to die for Danzig, and we 
remember the consequences of their decision.  Today, wiser owing to that experience, we 
appeal to the international community.  Peace, yes, but not at the price of accepting 
crime, brute force, and terrorism.  Peace, yes, if we can ensure it for all of us throughout 
the world.”91  In the same article, the newspaper also noted an announcement by the 
Polish Defense Minister, Jerzy Szmajdzinski, that a Polish logistical ship and the nation's 
Operational-Maneuver Reaction Group unit were already stationed in the Persian Gulf, 
and that a chemical decontamination platoon would be dispatched there as well on 21 
March.  The actions of the Polish government demonstrated a stance that was decidedly 
more inclined to support the United States, even while supporting UN intervention and a 
UN solution. 
Ultimately, when the decision was made, it was presented to the Sejm as a fait 
accompli and was presented to the Sejm formally only after the invasion of Iraq.  Despite 
the fact that the decision was made by the President and the government, the decision had 
the widespread support of nearly all parties represented in the Sejm.  Among those of the 
center-right, Poland's bonds with the United States were stressed, and a stand for 
democracy and against dictatorship was emphasized.  Parties of the left were equally 
supportive.  The only opposition tha t arose came from the far-right, largely populist, 
parties, including Self-Defense, the League of Polish Families, and the Polish Peasant 
Party.  In each of these cases, the act was deemed illegal, since the Sejm had not been 
consulted before the action was taken.  These parties were also extremely critical of the 
unilateral actions of the United States and the failure to receive UN endorsement for the 
intervention.  In any event, the only major opposition was from parties that were not 
viable political alternatives to the ruling government coalition.  These parties were 
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merely interested in discrediting the government rather than offering any substantive 
disagreement to the government's policy. 
In his address to the Sejm, Prime Minister Leszek Miller underscored the 
government's rationale for going to war.  In the first place, the decision to support the 
United States militarily was one that served Poland's national interest.  He listed three 
reasons to demonstrate this point.  In the first place, the invasion would lead to a “safe, 
stable, and predictable world.”92  Ultimately, the war in Iraq would create a world in 
which, according to Miller, “Poland, too, will be able to feel more secure.”93  Secondly, 
stability and predictability in Iraq would serve to solve many other problems in the 
Middle East.  Finally, Poland's participation would “confirm the significance of Poland's 
alliance with the United States and of transatlantic cooperation for the cohesiveness of 
NATO and the strategic demands of our country's security. ”94  In addition to this 
reference to the transatlantic relationship, Miller also cited the issue of reliability and the 
fact that only through Poland's support of the United States could they reasonably expect 
the United States to offer assistance to Poland in its hour of need.  The watchwords used 
time and again were the concepts of “solidarity” and reliability.  Regardless of the 
statements, Poland's deployment of a force as small as 200 men was a significant event, 
especially considering that two other EU members--Portugal and Spain--did not send any 
troops in support of the US-led invasion. 
2. Why Go to War? 
Many of the reasons purporting to explain Poland's support of the United States in 
the war in Iraq are related to economic spoils to be shared by the members of the 
American coalition.  There is little doubt that Poland expected to gain in stature in 
relation to the United States and that, as a reliable ally, it would receive some sort of 
tangible benefit from its allegiance.  Among the profits to be made, Poland would be able 
to recover the nearly 700 million dollars loaned to the Hussein regime and would be 
closely involved in the reconstruction effort following the war and would most likely 
                                                 





earn preferred status in contracts in Iraq's reconstruction.  According to journalist Jerzy 
Marek Nowakowski, Polish contributions to this reconstruction could be “between $2 
billion and $3 billion in the next few years.”95  At the same time, Poland had recently 
been able to purchase American F-16's that were accompanied by a nearly $12 billion 
offset agreement.  There was a sense among many studying Poland's overt support of the 
US position that Poland's allegiance was being purchased by the United States.  
According to many of its detractors, Poland's decision to purchase American-made F-16's 
vice British-Swedish Gripens or French Mirage 2000's was analogous to Poland's 
decision to support the US position regarding Iraq.  In both cases, Poland sided with the 
United States instead of aligning itself with its Western European neighbors.  Criticism of 
Poland's decision came from the European Commission's Enlargement Department head, 
Eneko Landaburu, as well as from the Commission President, Romano Prodi, himself.  
The French Foreign Minister was also outspoken in his disapproval of Poland's decision.  
According to French television, the foreign minister said that “France deplores Poland's 
decision to buy American F-16 fighter aircraft.”96  In each of these situations described 
above, condemnation of the fighter purchase was directly related to Poland's support of 
the US-led operation in Iraq. 
Among the other reasons that Poland supported the United States was the added 
perk that, by taking its own stance in opposition to France and Germany, Poland would 
strengthen its position within the European Union.  According to Jerzy Marek 
Nowakowski, a former chief advisor for international relations to Prime Minister Jerzy 
Buzek, instead of “kow-towing” to the supposed leadership of the European Union as 
many would recommend, Poland should not keep quiet because “Europe will not cope 
without the United States, and the role of an important US partner may strengthen our 
position in the European Union, even if this irritates Paris or Berlin.”97 
Another more limited bonus received during Poland's participation in the coalition 
was the practical experience that would be gained by participating Polish units.  In a plea 
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uttered by former Polish Defense Minister, Janusz Onyszkiewicz, in January 2003, in the 
event that conflict could not be avoided, the Polish government was advised that “it 
would be good if our partners and Allies let us send at least several Polish officers as 
interns who could assist US, British, or French officers and gain invaluable experience in 
carrying out this type of operation.”98  Given the eventual involvement of a Polish 
contingent of 2,400 troops in the stabilization portion of the intervention in Iraq, Polish 
troops have learned some useful information leading to a more professional military.  
According to Maria Wagrowska, a fellow at the Center for International Relations in 
Warsaw:  “[T]he experiences gathered in the course of the Iraqi mission proved to be 
valuable hints for the organization and modernization of the national armed forces.”99 
In the end, however, security guarantees trumped all of the perquisites that would 
follow from Poland's support of the US position.  Countless foreign policy experts and 
politicians have pointed to this fact.  Poland's Foreign Minister pointed this out in his 
address to the Sejm on 26 March 2003.  Cimoszewicz announced that the security of 
Poland “depends on the defence military credibility of the North Atlantic Alliance.  And 
the defence credibility of the North Atlantic Alliance depends to the highest degree on 
whether the United States is going to be involved and will feel jointly responsible for the 
security of Europe.”100  Speaking in 2003, then-Secretary of State of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Adam Rotfeld, stressed Poland's need to act in its own national interest 
and in the interest of its security.  He asserted that “Poland supported the intervention in 
Iraq, taking into account new global threats demonstrated by the 11th of September as 
well as the fact, that its neighbors will not protect Polish interests, both in the context of 
the European Union, and in security issues.”101  Reliability within NATO and as a 
partner to the United States has been the principal purpose of Poland's intervention in 
Iraq.  As one of the most vocal and most supportive allies relative to its role in the 
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international community, Poland has demonstrated the importance it places on a close 
relationship with the United States.  In return, Poland expects the security guarantees that 
the United States represents to be there when Poland is again threatened. 
3. Assessing the Actions of the Polish Government 
The Polish government's decision to participate in the war in Iraq was largely 
based on Poland's relationship with the United States and the recognition that the United 
States is the best guarantor of Poland's security.  Despite its impending membership in 
the European Union, the government decided that, regardless of the protestations of 
Germany and France, Poland would speak with its own voice and in the pursuit of its 
own national interests.  This entails that Poland look to its own perceived tenuous 
security situation.  In spite of the fact that most experts in Poland do not foresee a threat 
developing to the state's east, Poland must ensure that a credible guarantee of assistance 
exists in the event a threat does materialize.  In this instance that guarantee is provided by 
the United States.  An important way to ensure that this guarantee will be there when it is 
needed is for Poland to prove its own reliability and credibility as an ally.  Supporting the 
United States in Iraq presented just such opportunity for Poland to demonstrate its 
dependability. 
At the same time, many Poles believe that the European Union, led by France and 
Germany, are satisfied to subordinate Poland's own security concerns to its own 
economic and political interests.  There is also a sense that much of the European Union 
does not recognize the same security threats that Poland and many of its Eastern and 
Central European neighbors do.  Instead of trying to understand the support of the United 
States offered by Poland and the other EU candidate states in the region in the "gang of 
eight" letter and Vilnius Declarations, Jacques Chirac chose to denigrate the decision.  
Ultimately, Poland chose to support the United States because even while the European 
Union does not recognize the paramount threats perceived by Poland, the European 
Union's security and defense policy lacks the capabilities to provide a credible guarantee 
of its security. 
In June 2003, the Polish public easily ratified the EU Accession Treaty and 
Poland's membership in the European Union.  Despite the relief felt by many Polish 
politicians, who had feared a turn-out of less than the required 50% of Polish voters, 
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Poland's membership was not a “done deal. ”  Since the current member states had to 
ratify the new members' accession, Poland's membership could still be refused.  Given 
this situation and in light of Poland's steadfast support and participation in the war in 
Iraq, it is difficult to understand the position adopted by the Polish government in 
addressing the EU draft constitution beginning in December 2003. 
B. THE EUROPEAN UNION CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE 
On 17 and 18 June 2004, the Heads of State and Government of the European 
Union came together to reach an agreement on the EU constitutional treaty.  As Polish 
Prime Minister, Marek Belka stated on the last day in Brussels:  “I feel that Poland has 
achieved a great success, but Europe has achieved a success too…the adoption of the 
constitutional treaty is the joint success of all the European nations.”102  In late December 
2003, however, agreement on the treaty had been considered inconceivable, since the 
Polish delegation, as well as those representing at least 13 other states had objected to the 
revisions found in the draft treaty.  The first Brussels Summit had ended in failure.  In 
fact, as late as April 7, 2004, the Polish government had remained opposed to any 
revision to the Nice Treaty which might reduce their strength in decision-making in the 
Council as a member of the European Union.  Jan Truszczynski, the Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, laying out the government’s position before the Sejm maintained that: 
[W]hen it comes to the decision-making system in the Council of the EU,  
Poland has been guided by a fundamental guideline that there has to be a 
proper balance between major and minor count ries of the EU.  [T]he entry 
on the decision-making system in the Council of the EU that will be 
eventually included in the [Constitutional] Treaty should guarantee Poland 
with a position comparable to the one it has according to current 
regulations.103 
The current regulations cited above are those outlined in the Nice Treaty.  Poland 
was not the only state opposed to the revision of the terms of the Nice Treaty; the other 
states of the Visegrad Four were also opposed to the potential reduction of state weights 
within the European Union, including Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic.  In 
fact, according to an article in Warsaw Rzeczpospolita, published on November 4, 2003: 
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“Until recently, only Spain and Poland defended the Nice agreements with the support of 
the tiny Estonia and Malta.  At least 11 more states back the Nice system at the moment.  
Austria, Finland, Sweden, Portugal, Lithuania, Latvia, Denmark, Ireland, Hungary, the 
Czech Republic, and Slovakia have stepped forth with a firm demand that Germany and 
France modify their stance.”104  When the dust settled near the end of the second 
Brussels Summit, in June 2004, only Poland remained opposed to the EU draft 
constitution.  To the end Poland was determined to plead their case and defend their 
views.  More than just a difference of opinion, however, Poland's stance in the European 
Union constitutional debate demonstrates remarkably Poland's interest in ensuring that it 
will be taken seriously and its determination that it will be an influential member in the 
further integration and development of the European Union. 
1. The Nice Treaty of 2001 
The Nice Treaty, signed by the EU member states on 26 February 2001 and on 
which Poland's hopes for the draft constitution were pinned, was prompted by the need to 
consider revisions to the European Union's decision-making process prior to the addition 
of ten new members that was due to occur in 2004 or 2005.  The issues that would later 
be settled in the Nice Treaty were initially discussed at the Intergovernmental Conference 
(IGC) that met in February 2000.  According to a statement from Romano Prodi, 
President of the European Commission, and Michel Barnier, European Commissioner for 
Regional Policy and Institutional Reform, included in the preface to the European 
Union's “What Difference Will the Treaty of Nice Make?”:  “The aim of this conference 
was to adapt the way in which the European institutions operate in order to make it 
possible for the European Union to take in new Member States.”105  The Nice Treaty was 
thus more about procedural changes rather than structural ones. 
Major decisions were taken up by the European Union's heads of state and 
government that would affect the future members of the European Union.  Though the 
future states were unable to take part in the deliberations at Nice, they were invited to 
send representatives.  Among the major issues that were discussed at Nice were:  the 
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extension of qualified majority voting to other EU areas and provisions, a new allocation 
of weighted votes within the European Council, and the issue of one commissioner per 
state with a proposed ceiling of 27 commissioners making up the European Commission 
(a provision that would be effective in 2005). Once the Nice Treaty was signed and 
ratified, each country, including the 10 that joined the European Union in May 2004, 
would have a representative on the EU Commission.  Within the EU Council, qualified 
majority voting was approved for decision-making, with each country weighted 
according to its relative size.  Poland thus was allocated 27 votes, the same number as 
Spain--not many fewer than the 29 received by Britain, Germany, and France--and 
received its own commissioner.  Though Poland had no vote in the approval of the Nice 
Treaty, it was an associate member of the European Union and, as a candidate country, 
closely followed the treaty negotiations and the eventual outcome of those negotiations.  
The Treaty of Nice entered into force on 1 February 2003.  Despite this fact, even before 
its own ratification, the Treaty of Nice and its revised voting procedures were already 
under the scrutiny of the constitutional convention that was organized at the request of 
the European Council meeting in Laeken, Belgium. 
2. The Constitutional Convention 
The European Union's constitutional convention was an idea agreed upon at the 
European Council meeting held at Laeken, Belgium on 14 and 15 December 2001 and 
was chaired by a former French president, Valery Giscard d'Estaing.  Member states were 
to be represented on the convention with one representative from each and two 
representatives from each of their national parliaments.  Candidate member states would 
be represented in the same way, but would be “unable to prevent any consensus which 
may emerge among the Member States.”106  In explaining the purpose of the convention, 
the Presidency Conclusions of the Laeken meeting announced that: “[I]t will be the task 
of that Convention to consider the key issues arising for the Union's future development 
and try to identify the various possible responses.”107  Notably, there was no set agenda 
to be considered by the convention.  While the Presidency Conclusions discussed 
enlargement and the need to inject “greater transparency” and “simplification” through a 
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document bringing together the union's four treaties, the document was remarkably silent 
on the matter of a mandate.108  This serves to explain why, even before the Brussels 
Summit began in December 2003, there was little agreement regarding an appraisal of the 
product of Giscard d'Estaing's convention.  As the International Herald Tribune noted in 
its opinion pages on 11 December 2003:  “The Brussels summit about to take place 
closes (in principle) the year- long process devoted to giving an enlarged Europe a 
constitution.  The Europeans are far from agreement on the draft of that constitution.”109  
Principle among those in disagreement on the draft constitution was Poland. 
3. The EU Constitutional Debate 
After the constitutional convention published its findings and submitted its 
proposed constitution, the Polish government and its opposition expressed deep concerns 
with a number of issues within the proposal.  Even before the summit at which the heads 
of state and government of the EU member states were to negotiate the draft constitution, 
a number of meetings were held to hammer out a basic agreement on the text of the 
constitution.  Among these meetings was one arranged by the EU President, Italian Prime 
Minister Silvio Berlusconi that took place in late November 2003 in Naples, Italy 
between the EU foreign ministers.  At the heart of Polish opposition to the draft 
constitution to be adopted at the Brussels Summit scheduled for 12-13 December was the 
revision of the voting system that had been proposed by the Nice Treaty of February 
2001.  Changes made included scrapping weighted voting in favor of a double-majority, 
wherein a simple majority of states representing 60 percent of the EU population would 
be sufficient to pass proposals.  The number of EU Commissioners would be capped at 
15 and would serve on a rotational basis.  The rationale behind this decision was that a 
Commission of 25 would be too unwieldy and would make it incredibly difficult to reach 
agreements on proposed matters.  Other issues that served as stumbling blocks to the 
Polish government were subsidies to German companies that had been allowed to exceed 
those authorized by the European Union.  Subsidies provided by Germany to certain of 
its companies were initially approved in 1957 in response to the dire economic conditions 
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found in Germany following the end of the Second World War.  This issue had somehow 
never been revisited, or was allowed to remain in place regardless of Germany’s 
subsequent economic revival.  Additionally, a proposal was made for the establishment of 
a permanent EU military planning cell.  Countries interested in this institution were those 
most in favor of an EU Common Foreign and Security Policy and a European Security 
and Defense Policy with central roles opposed to those existing in NATO.  Finally, 
Poland, and several other countries including:  “[m]ainly Roman Catholic Ireland, Italy, 
Malta, Portugal, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia,” were insistent in their support of the 
inclusion of a reference to the Judeo-Christian heritage of Europe in the preamble of the 
Constitution. 110  Opposition to this initiative was comprised of secular states such as 
France, Belgium, and Denmark, as well as largely Muslim groups throughout the 
continent. 
At the meeting of the foreign ministers held in Naples, no progress was made on 
any of the above issues.  In fact, while Poland was joined by Spain on the issue of voting 
procedures and Austria on the issue of one commissioner per member state, other issues 
were criticized by other states, including the Netherlands which denounced the European 
Union's inability or unwillingness to punish France and Germany for breaking EU 
budgetary rules.111  While the meeting of the EU foreign ministers was proceeding in 
Naples, Polish President Kwasniewski spoke out on this same matter on the Polish radio 
program, “Signals of the Day.”  According to Polish radio, he emphasized that the fact 
“that France and Germany avoided punishment for excessive level of their budget deficits 
was an argument in favour of strengthening our [the Polish] position in the negotiations, 
and that the shape of the future EU constitution suggested by the EU Convention could 
strengthen positions of some member countries.”112 
Well before sending its delegation to Brussels to negotiate the constitution, the 
Polish government had agreed that the Nice Treaty was to remain in force and that those 
other objections voiced by Poland would have to be addressed before an agreement could 
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be reached.  While disagreement over the proposed voting procedures was the central 
obstacle to a Polish agreement, the government was unwilling to advocate the outspoken 
idea expressed by Jan Rokita, the former leader of the political party Civic Platform, who 
supported a bargaining position characterized by the phrase “Nice or Death (Die).”  The 
government's adherence to a position promoting the Nice Treaty voting rules was 
unanimously supported within the Sejm and was the position advanced by the Polish 
delegation which included the Prime Minister, Leszek Miller, and the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Wlodimierz Cimoszewicz.  As with the statement regarding the reference to 
Europe’s Judeo-Christian heritage, Poland enjoyed the support of other states on the other 
issues to which it objected.  The terms outlined in the Nice Treaty continued to be 
supported as well by Spain and the other members of the Visegrad Four. 
4. Brussels Summit I 
Poland maintained its opposition to the draft constitutional treaty for a number of 
reasons.  First, the Polish government was most concerned about the revisions of the Nice 
Treaty.  Resistance to the modifications of the Nice Treaty was based initially on the fact 
that the provisions of the treaty had not been tried within an enlarged European Union.  
The treaty had been based on the enlargement, but as the new member states had joined 
and the time had come for the system to be exercised, Germany and France balked and 
wanted to “change the rules.”  In an interview in mid-December, Leszek Miller even 
cited a comparison articulated by his wife, Aleksandra, who complained:  “'How can you 
prepare a dish of soup and then immediately say that it is no good without even trying 
it?'“113  Kwasniewski's position was similar--”let us first try Nice!”114  In fact, the Polish 
President even challenged Chirac and Schroeder to explain themselves.  As he asserted:  
“[W]hen they adopted this system, did President Jacques Chirac and Chancellor Gerhard 
Schroeder not see this disproportion?  It is up to them to explain why they supported it 
and why they now consider it bad.”115  Under the revised voting procedures, Poland 
would not have nearly the strength that it would have had under the Nice Treaty to 
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express its opposition.  Poland considered its role as a new, and considerably large, 
member of the European Union as one of protecting the smaller states from the dictates 
of the largest states.  Through its strength, both real and perceived, gained from the 
weight given it under the Nice Treaty, Poland expected to be able to prevent the largest 
countries in Europe from dominating the European Union.  The specific threat in this 
regard was that represented by France and Germany and the perceived Franco-German 
Bloc within the European Union.  According to Polish Foreign Minister Cimoszewicz, 
“‘the double majority’ system would ‘unusually strengthen the four largest, strongest 
members’—Germany, France, Britain, and Italy.  We are deeply convinced that Poland is 
defending the European ideal in its battle.”116  According to one Polish politician, Konrad 
Szymanski, opposition to the Nice Treaty is directly related to Poland’s ability to form a 
blocking minority with “like-minded member countries.”117  Szymanski makes a 
reference to Poland and Eastern Europe’s interest in the eastern dimension and those 
members of the European Union who border the Mediterranean and are interested in 
supporting the Magreb countries of North Africa.  He notes that, given the revisions of 
the Nice Treaty in the draft constitution, the percentage of votes controlled by “the 
coalition of the countries with interests in the eastern dimension of the European Union 
would then shrink to 18.4 from 23.3 percent.  It is no accident that the coalition of the 
Mediterranean countries, that is, of countries interested in the southern dimension of EU 
policy, is bolstered by the draft EU constitution to 35.1 percent from their former 30 
percent under the treaty of Nice.”118  Equally troublesome to Szymanski who is a 
member of Poland’s Law and Justice party was the amount of regulation imposed upon 
member states by the European Union.  He and the Law and Justice Party are interested 
in trimming and simplifying European law.  However, given the Franco-German bloc that 
he believes continues to favor even further regulation, “under the treaty of Nice these two 
countries together held a 17-percent vote whereas under the draft EU constitution they 
will enjoy a 29.3-percent vote.”119  The final issue that Poland had with the change in 
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voting rules was the perceived underhanded manner in which the issue had arisen.  
Contrary to common knowledge, French and German objections to the Nice Treaty 
voting weights were not immediately undertaken by the discussions or working groups of 
the convention.  In fact, as Jerzy Kranz, a former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
Ambassador to Germany, asserts:  “the Convention, at the inspiration of and with 
approval by France and Germany, came up with its proposal for the distribution of votes 
and the qualified majority thresholds at the end of April 2003, or quite all of a sudden 
when the Convention work had already been in its final stage.”120  Even more important 
was the lack of discussion on the issue that occurred within the convention and the fact 
that once Germany and France had agreed on their support of the issue, they did not 
consider it necessary to consult Poland.121  Finally, Poland and many other new states 
were also concerned that they would lack representation in the EU Commission if the 
number of commissioners was capped at 15.  The Polish government steadfastly adhered 
to the concept of “one country-one vote.” 
Even the apparently less important issues pointed to an inherent disagreement 
between Poland and France and Germany.  The issue of German subsidies was related to 
the concern associated with the unfair protection provided to German companies.  
Poland’s membership in the European Union would prohibit Poland from providing the 
same protection to its own companies.  Poland’s extensive western border with Germany 
and close trade relations only served to exacerbate the situation.  Finally, Polish 
insistence on the inclusion in the preamble of a statement referencing the Judeo-Christian 
heritage of Europe was a cultural issue.  As an overwhelmingly Catholic state with close 
ties to a Polish Pope who had endorsed the idea of this reference, it was critical that it be 
included.  The Polish government was unwilling to budge in this regard, especially given 
the fact that the idea was widely supported by the people of Poland.  Ultimately, Poland 
was left with the impression that the only compromise to be made was on their side. 
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When the Brussels Summit concluded on 13 December, it was judged by the 
majority of the European Union, principally France and Germany, as a total failure.  The 
reaction was immediate.  According to scholar Mark Gilbert in his article “‘A Fiasco, But 
Not a Disaster’:  Europe’s Search for a Constitution, ” “Chancellor Gerhard Schröder 
hinted broadly that Germany would not carry on paying for the EU if the constitution 
were not adopted.”122  Regarding French President Jacques Chirac, Gilbert notes that 
while he insisted “there was no ‘crisis with a capital C,’ [he] also brandished the threat 
that a ‘pioneer group of countries’ centered upon France and Germany would pursue 
advanced integration in a wide range of areas:  the ‘two-speed Europe’ that supporters of 
European integration have hitherto sought to avoid.”123  Poland and the other countries 
opposed to the draft constitution were condemned for acting outside the interests of 
Europe.  The European Union remained focused, however, on achieving an agreement.  
While some European publications blamed France and Germany for the impasse, 
considerable blame was also leveled against Spain and Poland for their outspoken 
positions and unwillingness to deal. 
5. Reassessment of Position 
The returning Polish delegation was happily greeted by the ruling parties as well 
as those of the opposition.  Describing the support for Leszek Miller’s position at 
Brussels, Heather Grabbe, former Deputy Director of the Center for European Reform 
and currently serving in the cabinet of the EU Commissione r for Enlargement, says that 
“Miller found his tough EU stance to be the only area where he enjoys the support of all 
political parties.  But short-term political gain was not the only reason for Miller’s hard 
line.  Many Poles were pleased to see their prime minister say “no” to Germany and 
France because they resent how the EU has treated Poland in the last few years.”124  All 
of Poland’s political parties were steadfast in their support of the Nice Treaty.  Among 
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the statements of support that the government received, the heads of the parliamentary 
floor groups of both Civic Platform (PO) and Law and Justice were particularly 
indicative of the unified stance of Poland's political parties.  After meeting with Prime 
Minister Leszek Miller following his return from Brussels, Donald Tusk of Civic 
Platform insisted that “[t]he conviction that it is worthwhile continuing being together on 
this matter so important for Poland, the maintenance of the Nice system and the good 
position of Poland in the EU during negotiations concerning the EU constitutional treaty, 
is a joint one.”125  Ludwik Dorn of Law and Justice stressed that it was important for 
Miller to know with certainty “that he has behind him the support of Polish political 
forces.”126 
Outside Poland, in the interim between the first and second Brussels Summits, 
meetings were held between Britain, France, and Germany that disquieted those states 
that had prevented an agreement in Brussels in December 2003.  At the same time, there 
was talk by France of a two-speed organization with some integrating faster than others.  
Jacques Chirac had in mind “a pioneer group,” based around the original six members of 
the European Coal and Steel Community.  According to an article in the Economist, 
however, this was highly unlikely to succeed since “Italy, the Netherlands, and even 
Luxembourg [had] said they [did] not favor it.”127  Despite this fact, some of Poland's 
allies, such as the Czech Republic, readily acknowledged that if there was to be a core 
group within the European Union they wanted to be a member. 
By the end of March 2004, Poland began to lose the support that it had enjoyed 
from other states within the European Union opposed to the draft constitution.  When the 
Socialist Party assumed control in Spain following the Madrid bombings, it quickly 
began to maneuver the Spanish government’s position much closer to that of France and 
Germany.  Meanwhile, other states began to defect.  In the face of this dwindling support, 
Poland maintained its adherence to a constitution that included the voting provisions 
provided for in the Nice Treaty. 
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6. Brussels Summit II 
When the Heads of State and Government of the European Union met again in 
Brussels on 15 June 2004, an agreement on the constitution was ultimately achieved.  
Returning home, the Polish Interim-Prime Minister, Marek Belka, claimed victory.  The 
opposition within the government, however, was relentless in its criticism of the 
agreement.  Janusz Lewandowski, a newly elected member of the European Parliament 
and member of Civic Platform, declared:  “‘This is a Polish concession with a lack of 
concessions on the part of so-called old Europe.’”128  The leader of the Law and Justice 
Party, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, said “that after elections PiS (Law and Justice Party) would 
not enter into an alliance with any party that would wish to accept the EU 
constitution.”129  Finally, Wojciech Wierzejski, an MEP for LPR, “said his party planned 
to file charges against Poland’s delegates to the EU Brussels summit, who in agreeing to 
the EU Constitution had ‘worsened Poland’s position within the EU.’”130  The opposition 
was unanimous in their condemnation of the agreement achieved by the delegation.  
Despite the rhetoric of the opposition, Prime Minister Belka celebrated the agreement 
because he had been able to achieve some sort of concession on each of the points 
contended at the December 2003 summit. 
In the end, as the state representing the final obstacle to reaching an agreement, 
Poland had eventually relented in its opposition.  Though Poland accepted the double-
majority system in lieu of the voting system under the Nice Treaty, it was able to achieve 
a requirement for a higher percentage of EU members representing a higher percentage of 
the EU population in order to pass any proposal.  Under the initial double-majority 
proposal, agreement was required by a simple majority of the member states, representing 
60 percent of the EU population.  Poland achieved agreement on a system requiring 
agreement by 55 percent of the member states representing 65 percent of the population.  
In addition to this, a “braking mechanism” was achieved, wherein as few as 25 percent of 
the member states could delay a proposal and force additional negotiations for an 
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undetermined period of time.  Second, Poland reached an agreement to revisit the 
question of German subsidies in five years.  Third, the European Union scrapped the idea 
of a permanent EU planning cell and agreed to include terminology referencing 
cooperation and coordination with NATO.  Fourth, Poland would be allowed to nominate 
its own commissioner by 2014.  Equally important is the fact that there was agreement to 
a shared presidency within the European Union—a three-member presidency will share 
the office.  Finally, Poland did not achieve their long-held objective of inclusion of a 
reference to Europe’s Judeo-Christian heritage.  In spite of that, Belka, his Foreign 
Minister, and the President were pleased with the outcome reached. 
7. Assessing the Actions of the Polish Government 
The Polish government's stance in the EU constitutional debate was influenced by 
a variety of factors--namely those related to Poland's perceived national interests.  In 
order to be considered an equal among the leading members of the European Union, 
Poland was compelled to protect its interests.  Ultimately, Poland's stubbornness was 
borne of its unwillingness to give up its voice in decision-making--no matter that some 
decisions were not to be tied to national security and other issues reserved to the realm of 
state sovereignty.  As Adam Michnik, the editor of Gazeta Wyborcza, made clear in 
answering a question posed by The Guardian:  “‘There’s no point preaching to us or 
pushing us.  It won’t work.  We didn’t regain our own voice just to give it up.’”131 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
The decisions made by the Polish government in their support of Iraq and their 
criticism of the EU draft constitution, were related issues, but only insomuch as they 
represented Poland's desire to somehow reconcile once again capabilities and interests to 
guarantee Poland's security.  Each of them reveals Poland's continuing reliance on both 
the United States and Europe for different purposes.  Poland's support of the war in Iraq 
reflected Poland's desire to tie the United States to the security assurances promised and 
underscored its belief that the United States is the underwriter of Poland's security.  
However, the credibility of this assurance must continue to be reinforced by Polish 
demonstrations of its reliability.  Poland's decision to support the United States in Iraq, 
while still a candidate for EU membership and in opposition to the stated position of 
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France and Germany, emphasizes the importance that the Polish government placed on 
this sign of solidarity.  Poland's support also represents its unwillingness, for now, to 
place its trust in the European Union to provide for its security. 
On the European continent, Poland expresses little interest in signing away its 
security to France and Germany.  If the European Union is to achieve a defense 
capability, complementary to that provided by NATO, Poland is determined that it will 
play a central role.  Equally important to Poland is the further development and continued 
integration of the European Union.  Poland understands that Europe will not be a credible 
defender of Poland unless it acknowledges the same threats and considers them in the 
development of a common European security and defense policy.  Only through its 
willingness to take a stand and makes its interests heard, as in the case of the 
constitutional debate, can Poland ensure that the direction of this development is such 
that Poland will benefit.  Though the debate on the constitution had little to do with 
security-related issues, the Polish position demonstrated that Poland would make its case 
on any issue in which it had an interest.  The conclusion to be drawn is that in the realm 
of security Poland could be expected to be even more stubborn.  Poland is certainly 
interested in the development of a common European security and defense policy, but 
only one in which its security concerns and interests, as well as those of Europe's smaller 
members for whom Poland will speak out, are taken into account and acknowledged.  In 
the EU debate on the constitution, it is important to note that Poland was the last member 
to agree to the treaty--even while, at the time, it had only been a member of the European 




Poland's historical framework imposed several constraints on the democratic 
government that emerged following the end of the Cold War.  Without the option of 
simply declaring its neutrality, Polish politicians were compelled to seek security 
guarantees to protect their new-found independence.  At the same time, there was a desire 
among Polish elites to anchor the state into Western institutions and to rejoin Europe.  
With that in mind, Lech Walesa and his foreign minister, Krzysztof Skubiszewicz, 
appealed to NATO and the European Union for membership. 
Upon achieving membership, the actions taken by the Polish government as a 
member of both NATO and the European Union reflected Polish security policy's 
unquestionably atlanticist foundation.  As a result of Polish credibility concerns related to 
its allies throughout its history, Poland sought to demonstrate its reliability in the hopes 
that, when Poland must call upon them, its allies will respond in kind.  While the 
European Union and NATO have evolved as institutions from their original purposes 
during the Cold War, the Polish perception of them has remained unchanged. 
After 9/11, when the threat perceptions of the United States and Europe diverged 
and a transatlantic rift emerged, Poland found itself in a position in which it might now 
be compelled to choose between Europe and the United States.  Despite the unwillingness 
of Polish politicians to consider such a choice, their decisions would serve to exacerbate 
Poland's resulting balancing act in its relations with the United States and Europe.  Given 
Poland's decision to defy the stated joint position of France and Germany to support the 
US-led war in Iraq and its decision to staunchly defend its interests in the EU 
constitutional debate, one could have surmised that Poland had forsaken its European ties 
and membership in the European Union for a "special" relationship with the United 
States. 
Ultimately, however, when one considers Poland's actions as a member of NATO 
and the European Union and the factors that influenced its decisions to support the United 
States in Iraq and to challenge Germany and France on the EU constitution, Poland's 
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actions reflect something quite unexpected.  In the short term, Poland will certainly 
continue to rely on the security guarantees of the United States and NATO, especially in 
light of the yet undeveloped capabilities of the  European Union's security and defense 
policy.  However, as the European Union continues to further integrate and husband its 
resources, Poland will seek to use its influence within the union to direct its development 
in order to improve the ability of its fellow European states to provide support to the 
United States and NATO.  In light of this situation I believe that although Poland would 
definitely prefer to maintain US influence in Europe for its own security as well as to 
maintain stability within Europe, in the event that the roles of NATO and the United 
States continue to diminish and US interests continue to differ with those of Europe, 
Poland will most certainly rely on the security that the European Union would provide 
them.  This development and eventuality has specific policy implications for both the 
United States and Europe in the future. 
B. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. United States 
The United States has largely taken for granted the allegiance that Poland and its 
Eastern and Central European neighbors have provided since 9/11.  In exchange for their 
political support, in many cases achieved in direct opposition to their publics, the United 
States has failed to provide tangible acknowledgement of their sacrifices and 
understanding of the difficult position in which its support has placed Poland within the 
European Union.  The US government should strive to repair the rift that resulted from 
the war in Iraq to prevent placing Poland at odds with France, Germany, and the rest of 
Europe.  At the same time, the United States should continue to support the development 
of European defense capabilities and a common foreign and security policy.  A stable 
Europe is as important to the United States as it is to Europe itself.  Ultimately, the 
United States should reward Poland's support and work to seriously consider its interests 
to strengthen the already strong relationship. 
2. Europe 
Europe, especially France and Germany, has taken for granted Polish interests.  In 
joining the European Union, the terms of Poland's accession did not provide the sort of 
welcome that Poland had envisioned.  Rather than joining under the same conditions as 
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other states had, Poland was subjected to limited immigration, reduced CAP subsidies, 
and reduced voting rights.  Equally troubling to the Polish people was the presumption by 
France and Germany to speak for Poland in determining the EU position toward the war 
in Iraq and the harsh treatment Poland received during EU constitution negotiations.  
Given Poland's propensity to support European initiatives, including the security and 
defense policy, France and Germany should take into account the interests, especially 
those related to security, of its newest members to avoid alienating them.  Concerns over 
security will inevitably take priority over any other consideration in these states and if 
Europe does not seriously consider their perceived threats there will be an unquestioned 
tendency by these states to seek elsewhere the guarantees they require.  Bearing in mind 
Poland's historical concerns with Russia, France and Germany should not seek bilateral 
relations with Russia, while failing to consider the implied message this sends to Poland.  
Instead, Europe should seek to formulate a cohesive European policy toward Russia and 
the states that comprise the European Union's Eastern Dimension.  Only by engaging in 
this sort of discussion will Europe ultimately be able to cultivate a common European 
foreign and security policy on the continent. 
For the time being, Poland will continue to align itself with the United States to 
guarantee its security.  At this point in time, it must.  In the long run, however, Poland's 
security will lie with those near whom it resides and with whom it shares its various 
economic, political, and security interests--the European Union.  Both the European 
Union and the United States have work to do in their relationships with Poland.  Poland's 
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